As of 27 September 2026 morning, what we know about The TERA Fund Scandal in Türkiye?

We may be witnessing one of Türkiye’s biggest financial scandals. Here is a roundup by Perplexity:

The TERA Fund Scandal in Türkiye

Status: 27 September 2026

Executive assessment

The “TERA scandal” is best understood as a fund-liquidity crisis combined with a widening criminal investigation into alleged market manipulation, self-dealing, fraud and suspicious money flows. It is not solely a TERA affair: the regulatory intervention covers 131 funds established by seven portfolio-management companies—Tera, Pusula, Hedef, Atlas, A1 Capital, Pardus and Bulls. TERA is nevertheless central because two Tera Portföy funds formally defaulted on redemption payments, the firm managed a particularly large pool of assets, and several senior TERA figures have been remanded in custody.[^1][2][^3]

Three layers should be kept separate:

• Established regulatory facts: redemption defaults occurred; trading was suspended; 131 funds are being liquidated under bank supervision; 455,758 unique investors hold units in the affected funds.[^4][2][^1]
• Prosecutorial allegations: some funds and shares were allegedly manipulated through “Ponzi-like” methods, misleading promotion and transactions involving concentrated or related-party positions. These allegations are under investigation and have not produced final judgments.[^5][6]
• Political and journalistic allegations: regulators allegedly ignored warnings, politically connected investors may have exited early, and TERA may have benefited from protection. These claims raise serious questions but are not, at present, judicially established.[^7][8][^9]

The available evidence supports describing this as a market-structure and governance scandal, not merely a temporary liquidity accident. The central economic problem was that funds offered investors apparent liquidity while holding large positions in thinly traded shares whose quoted prices could not necessarily be realised during mass withdrawals. The central legal question is whether this fragility arose from aggressive but lawful portfolio choices or from deliberate price manipulation, related-party dealing and deceptive fundraising.[^10][11][^12]

What happened

The pre-crisis structure

SPK says it had observed since the final quarter of 2025 that certain free funds and money-market funds were contributing to price movements in low-free-float shares that could not be explained by the companies’ fundamentals. The regulator says the matter was discussed by the Financial Stability Committee on 2 December 2025, a working group began on 3 December, and the eventual rule changes were published on 28 August 2026.[^13]

Those rules tightened concentration, valuation, repo, collateral and related-party financing practices. SPK explicitly said the reform was designed to reduce systemic risks produced by unsecured related-party borrowing and unusual stock-price movements, limit manipulation through funds and improve transparency.[^11][13]

The market mechanism described by Reuters, the Financial Times and Turkish financial reporting was a reinforcing cycle:

1. Funds accumulated large holdings in shares with limited free float and low market depth.
2. Fund purchases helped lift those shares’ quoted prices.
3. Rising quoted prices boosted the funds’ published returns.
4. High returns attracted new investors and additional cash.
5. New cash could be used to buy the same or connected shares, reinforcing both share prices and reported fund performance.
6. Once withdrawals accelerated, selling those concentrated holdings without depressing their prices became extremely difficult.[^14][15][^10]

This resembles a feedback loop and may display “Ponzi-like” dynamics, but that description does not by itself prove a classic Ponzi scheme. A traditional Ponzi pays earlier investors directly with later investors’ money and lacks sufficient genuine assets; the funds here held identifiable securities, although their realisable values and the legitimacy of the trading behind them are disputed. “Ponzi-like” is therefore best treated as an official allegation and explanatory analogy, not a concluded legal classification.[^6][16]

The immediate trigger

The final break came after Pusula Portföy reported difficulty meeting redemptions and Tera Portföy disclosed similar problems. On 16 September, Tera Portföy formally announced that its Tera Portföy Hisse Senedi (TL) Fonu had defaulted on unit-redemption payments; it also reported a default in its money-market fund and lengthened valuation and payment periods for several other funds.[^2][17]

Tera said the changes were needed to manage liquidity and prevent forced sales under adverse conditions. Emre Tezmen characterised the episode as a planned, organised speculative attack and said TERA faced only a temporary liquidity shortage.[^17][14]

The disclosures intensified withdrawals and selling across Borsa İstanbul. Reuters reported that the BIST 100 fell sharply, triggering market-wide intervention, while the Financial Stability Committee attributed the disturbance to credit and liquidity problems at a limited number of funds and called it temporary and manageable.[^18][19]

Regulatory intervention

SPK’s 17 September 2026 bulletin did two distinct things. First, it closed all TEFAS-traded funds established by the seven named portfolio managers to purchases and redemptions. Second, it ordered a specified group of funds to be liquidated under procedures to be determined by the regulator.[^20]

The following day’s implementation framework produced the definitive list of 131 funds. Of these, six were Tera Portföy funds: Birinci Serbest Fon, Dördüncü Hisse Senedi Serbest Fon, Hisse Senedi (TL) Fonu, Para Piyasası (TL) Fonu, Para Piyasası Katılım (TL) Fonu and Üçüncü Hisse Senedi Serbest Fon.[^1]

The discrepancy between early reports citing roughly 353,000 investors and the later official figure of 455,758 reflects preliminary estimates versus MKK’s subsequent unique-investor count. The SPK figure should be preferred.[^4][10]

How liquidation works

İş Bankası and Ziraat Bankası are to reconcile investors’ units, outstanding orders, claims, liabilities and encumbrances; take control of the relevant custody arrangements; and sell fund assets with regard to investor interests, market depth and liquidity. Cash may be distributed in stages and proportionately rather than only at the end of the process.[^1]

Unexecuted TEFAS redemption requests covered by the decision are recorded as fund liabilities and receive priority from realised cash. The process does not mean the money has been confiscated or that investors automatically lose everything; it means recovery depends on the cash actually generated after liabilities and costs are settled.[^23][1]

This distinction is critical. A fund’s last published net asset value can be materially higher than the price obtainable when a large, concentrated position is sold into a thin market. Investors therefore cannot yet know either the timing or the percentage of their reported account value they will recover.[^24][12]

The criminal case

Suspected conduct

The investigation is being led by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office with SPK and MASAK involvement. Public reporting indicates that prosecutors are examining whether:

• Fund money was directed into TERA or related-company shares to raise their prices.
• Money-market funds were used to channel finance to group companies.
• Company owners paid cash in exchange for having fund managers support their shares.
• Misleading information or coordinated transactions induced investors to enter funds or shares.
• Large transfers lacked a genuine commercial explanation or represented laundering or asset flight.[^25][26][^27]

At least in Emre Tezmen’s reported referral, the alleged offences included aggravated fraud in commercial activity, establishing a criminal organisation and violating Article 107/2 of the Capital Markets Law. These remain accusations; detention pending trial is not a conviction.[^5]

People and status

Emre Tezmen, Tera Yatırım Holding’s chair; Alper Öztürk, identified in reports as Tera Portföy’s former general manager; TERA board figures Emre Alkin and Kerem Alkin; and Pusula chair Serdar Turhan were detained on 19 September and subsequently remanded in custody.[^28][29]

The case rapidly expanded beyond these five. As of 25 September, Justice Minister Akın Gürlek said 76 suspects had faced judicial action, 45 had been remanded in custody, five placed under judicial control, 12 were being sought and 14 remained in detention procedures. Authorities also seized or froze assets belonging to fund owners, senior managers and first-degree relatives.[^30][31]

These totals concern the broader fund investigation, not only TERA. They should not be read as 45 TERA employees or as proof that all seven portfolio companies participated in identical conduct.

Statements attributed to executives

Leaked prosecution statements, reported across several Turkish outlets, reveal an important conflict. Tezmen reportedly said that he made strategic decisions for the wider group but did not participate in the portfolio company’s individual buy-and-sell decisions; he denied self-dealing, cash-for-price-support arrangements and personal benefit from share-price increases.[^26][32]

Öztürk reportedly said his portfolio-management role was “on paper” and that certain share purchases reflected the will of the controlling shareholder’s senior management. If accurately reported and supported by records, that account could undermine the defence that the portfolio company operated independently; however, leaked interrogation material is not equivalent to tested evidence in open court.[^33][26]

Prosecutors also questioned Tezmen about a reported TRY 1.159 billion transfer on 28 August 2026. Tezmen said he believed it concerned the acquisition of Prive Sigorta but did not recall the details. The existence, purpose and legal character of this transaction require documentary and judicial verification.[^26]

Money transfers

Authorities reported transfers of USD 15 million from Serdar Turhan and EUR 25 million from Muhammed Yarız to Swiss accounts before the redemption defaults. These are significant evidentiary leads, but both reported transfers concern Pusula-linked individuals, not proof of a transfer by TERA or Tezmen.[^34][35]

Some coverage has folded the Swiss transfers into a generic “TERA scandal” narrative. That is imprecise. The investigation links several corporate groups and transactions, but attribution must remain person- and company-specific unless prosecutors establish a common scheme.

TERA’s defence

TERA has advanced two principal explanations. First, Tezmen blamed a coordinated speculative attack and said the core problem was temporary liquidity stress rather than insolvency or wrongdoing.[^17]

Second, Tera Portföy said redemption instructions surged to approximately TRY 300 billion while incoming funds were being invested, making immediate payment difficult for any institution. It said some redemptions in four non-liquidation funds were paid between 16 and 18 September, but subsequent Takasbank restrictions and blocks prevented further payments.[^36][34]

The TRY 300 billion figure is a stated volume of redemption requests, not a verified investor loss or an admitted debt of the same amount. It also does not resolve why a professionally managed fund structure lacked sufficient liquidity to honour ordinary redemption terms, nor whether asset concentration and related-party exposures contributed to the run.[^12]

Prior warnings

A major Turkish-language strand concerns former MASAK deputy chair and bank inspector Ramazan Başak. Barış Terkoğlu reported that Başak petitioned CİMER on 30 July 2025 and filed a criminal complaint on 5 January 2026 alleging suspicious money traffic, laundering, tax evasion, market fraud and regulatory neglect involving Tera Yatırım.[^37][7]

Terkoğlu further reported that Başak had highlighted extraordinary gains in TERA-related shares and funds and later faced investigations after publicly accusing TERA of manipulation. These are consequential allegations about whistleblowing and institutional retaliation, but the underlying complete petitions, case files and agency correspondence have not all been independently published or judicially authenticated in the sources reviewed.[^7]

The Hazine ve Maliye Bakanlığı separately rejected the allegation that Minister Mehmet Şimşek had any partnership, commercial tie or business relationship with Emre Tezmen in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. No reviewed source establishes such a commercial relationship.[^8][38]

The official record nonetheless creates an accountability problem. SPK now says it recognised abnormal, fundamentals-defying price movements in late 2025, yet the decisive portfolio rules arrived on 28 August 2026 and mass liquidation followed less than three weeks later. SPK explains the interval as a technically complex consultation and infrastructure process involving Borsa İstanbul, Takasbank, MKK, the industry and the ministry; critics view it as delayed intervention that allowed risks to grow.[^39][13]

Political claims

Opposition leader Özgür Özel alleged that a TERA fund rose 948-fold while closed to the wider public and demanded disclosure of who held units during that period and who exited before the collapse. Reporting also refers to claims that only 12 investors benefited during an earlier closed period.[^9][40]

These claims have not been substantiated in the reviewed official SPK releases with a named-investor list, transaction ledger or audited calculation. They are legitimate subjects for investigation—MKK, Takasbank, distributors and SPK should possess the relevant entry, exit and beneficial-owner records—but should not yet be presented as proven insider trading.[^37]

Turkish and English coverage

English-language coverage tends to frame the case as an emerging-market “fund run” and a “Ponzi-like” scandal. Turkish reporting provides more detail on domestic actors, earlier complaints and alleged political links, but also contains more openly partisan interpretation. The most reliable reading therefore triangulates official SPK/KAP documents with Reuters/BBC technical reporting and treats political or leaked-case claims as provisional.

What is proven

• Tera Portföy disclosed redemption defaults in at least its equity fund and money-market fund.[^2][17]
• SPK suspended TEFAS trading for funds established by seven portfolio managers and ordered 131 funds into liquidation.[^20][1]
• The affected funds have 455,758 unique investors according to official MKK records.[^4]
• İş Bankası is responsible for TERA’s fund liquidations; Ziraat Bankası handles the other six groups.[^1]
• Emre Tezmen and four other senior TERA/Pusula figures were remanded in custody, and the wider investigation had reached 45 remand prisoners by 25 September.[^29][30]
• SPK acknowledges that it had observed problematic price movements from late 2025 and introduced rules aimed at related-party borrowing, unusual price formation and manipulation risk.[^13]

What remains alleged

• That TERA or its executives deliberately manipulated prices rather than merely taking concentrated, risky positions.
• That fund money was systematically used to inflate TERA-group or client-company shares.
• That payments were made to fund managers in return for price support.
• That a coordinated criminal organisation committed aggravated fraud or laundering.
• That politically connected investors received privileged entry or exit opportunities.
• That regulators protected TERA or intentionally ignored actionable warnings.

None of these propositions should be stated as adjudicated fact until indictments, underlying transaction data and final court decisions are public.

Unanswered questions

Investor recovery

The most immediate unknown is the liquidation value of the portfolios. Recovery will depend on the quality and marketability of each fund’s assets, secured and unsecured liabilities, the order of claims, selling costs and whether disposals can avoid severe price discounts.[^23][1]

Beneficial ownership

Authorities have not publicly released a complete account of who invested during closed or restricted periods, who redeemed shortly before the defaults, or whether any of those investors had ties to fund managers, listed companies or public officials. This is the evidentiary core of the opposition’s “who got out early?” question.[^9][37]

Related-party exposure

Public reporting gives examples of funds holding TERA-related or TERA-underwritten shares, but a complete, date-by-date map of common ownership, underwriting relationships, repo collateral, voting power and fund exposure is still unavailable. Such a map is necessary to distinguish legal investment from abusive circular financing.[^43][11]

Regulatory responsibility

SPK’s chronology confirms awareness of unusual price formation months before the crisis, but it does not fully answer why interim concentration limits, enhanced disclosure, stress tests or redemption-liquidity requirements were not imposed earlier. Nor is it yet clear whether earlier complaints were investigated adequately and independently.[^7][13]

Criminal proof

The case will ultimately turn on transaction-level evidence: coordinated orders, communications, beneficial ownership, money trails, valuation methods, false representations and the intent of each defendant. Extraordinary returns, concentrated holdings and subsequent illiquidity are red flags; they are not by themselves proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Bottom line

The strongest current conclusion is that TERA sat at the centre of a wider fund ecosystem whose liquidity promises were incompatible with concentrated exposure to illiquid shares. Regulatory changes and mass withdrawals exposed that mismatch, producing defaults, forced intervention and a large-scale liquidation. There is credible reason for a criminal investigation, particularly given SPK’s own description of abnormal price formation and the reported governance conflicts, but the precise division between manipulation, self-dealing, reckless risk-taking and panic-driven collapse remains to be established in court.[^18][26][^13]

The scandal’s deepest institutional issue is not simply whether several managers broke the law. It is whether Türkiye’s fund-distribution, disclosure and supervisory system allowed quoted gains in thin markets to be marketed as accessible wealth long after regulators had identified the underlying risk. The answers will require publication of transaction records, beneficial-owner data, portfolio valuations, earlier complaints and a transparent account of regulatory decisions—not only arrests and liquidation announcements.

References

1. SPK 2026/61, A/5 – SERMAYE PİYASASI KURULU BÜLTENİ – C) 17.09.2026 tarih ve 2026/60 sayılı Kurul Bülteni’nde Kurulca tayin edilecek yöntem ile tasfiye et…
2. tera portföy hisse senedi (tl) fonu (hisse senedi yoğun fon)
3. Turkey detains five as part of fund liquidation investigation, … – Turkish authorities detained five people as part of an investigation launched after some investment …
4. [PDF] Tasfiye Konusu Fonlardaki Yatırımcı Sayısına İlişkin Açıklama
5. Emre Tezmen dahil 5 kişinin savcılık ifadeleri tamamlandı – KARAR – Sermaye piyasalarında gerçekleştirilen işlemlere ilişkin yürütülen fon soruşturmasında gözaltına alı…
6. Fon soruşturmasında 5 yönetici adliyeye sevk edildi – | Milli Gazete – Fon soruşturması kapsamında gözaltına alınan Pusula Holding Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı Serdar Turhan ile…
7. Barış Terkoğlu yazdı : Hepiniz biliyorsunuz zarların hileli olduğunu! | Cumhuriyet – Her eve geldiğinde hırsızla karşılaşıyorsan belki hırsız evin içindendir. Biliyorum, vatandaş fonmuş…
8. Hazine ve Maliye Bakanlığı’ndan Emre Tezmen açıklaması! – Ramazan Başak’ın fon krizi yaşanmadan tam 14 ay önce 30 Temmuz 2025’te, CİMER’e Tera Yatırım ile ilg…
9. Özgür Özel’den borsa tepkisi: İnsanların canına okudular, kul hakkı … – YENİ Parti Genel Başkanı Özgür Özel, Tera Fonunun kapalı olduğu dönemde yapılan işlemlerin ve kazanç…
10. Explainer: Why Turkey’s stock market is under scrutiny after … – Turkey’s equity market is under scrutiny after a week of turmoil, as regulators grapple with investm…
11. SPK fon düzenlemesinin hazırlık aşamasını anlattı! Sürecin … – Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu (SPK), 28 Ağustos’ta kamuoyuna duyurduğu Yatırım Fonlarına İlişkin Rehber’de…
12. How Tera Portföy’s Liquidity Crisis Exposed the Risks … – When large positions become concentrated in relatively illiquid securities, the last traded price ma…
13. Yatırım Fonlarına İlişkin Rehber Düzenleme Süreci Açıklaması – Yatırım Fonlarına İlişkin Rehber Düzenleme Süreci Açıklaması. 18 Eylül 2026 … 2025 yılı son çeyreğ…
14. Turkey detains Tera fund executive in stock manipulation probe – Turkish Minute – Turkish police on Thursday detained a senior manager at Tera Portföy, the Tera financial group’s inv…
15. Türkiye’de fon krizi nasıl başladı, nereye gidiyor? – Türkiye’de bazı yatırım fonlarının düşük işlem hacimli hisselerde büyüttüğü pozisyonlar, yatırımcı ç…
16. Financial Times Türkiye’deki fon krizini yazdı: ‘Ponzi benzeri sistem’ – İngiliz gazete Financial Times, gelişmeleri “Türkiye, ‘Ponzi benzeri sistemin’ merkezindeki fonları …
17. Tera Portföy’ün para piyasası fonunda temerrüt: İade ödemelerinde … – Tera Portföy bünyesindeki TLY, TMV ve DOH fonlarında katılma payı iade esasları değiştirildi. Üç fon…
18. Turkey steps in to support markets after fund liquidity … – Turkey steps in to support markets after fund liquidity crunch sparks selloff. By Ezgi Erkoyun and M…
19. Borsadaki sert düşüş sonrası toplanan Finansal İstikrar Komitesi: Temel veya yapısal bir risk yok, sorun geçici ve yönetilebilir; tüm tedbirler süratle alınacak – “Kararlaştırılan tedbirler, başta likidite sıkışıklığının giderilmesi ve bulaşma riskinin önlenmesin…
20. SPK Bülteni 2026/60
21. Turkey mandates Isbank and Ziraat to liquidate $18.3 billion … – Turkey’s Capital Markets Board (SPK) on Friday appointed Isbank ​and Ziraat Bank to oversee ‌the liq…
22. Spk Web – Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu
23. Fon krizinde yatırımcıların parası nasıl geri ödenebilir? – Türkiye’de 131 yatırım fonunun tasfiye sürecine alınmasının ardından, bu fonlarda birikimi bulunan y…
24. Turkey Arrests Fund Managers Over Stock Market Manipulation Scandal – Authorities arrest fund managers suspected of manipulating markets and liquidate 130 troubled invest…
25. Fon skandalında düğüm noktası… Fon parasına gerçekte kim … – Sermaye piyasası işlemlerine ilişkin yürütülen soruşturma kapsamında tutuklanan Tera Yatırım Holding…
26. Emre Tezmen ve Alper Öztürk’ün ifadeleri ortaya çıktı – Sermaye piyasası işlemlerine ilişkin yürütülen soruşturma kapsamında tutuklanan Tera Yatırım Holding…
27. Son dakika… Fon soruşturmasında kritik gelişme: MASAK’a 4 şirket için ‘yeni inceleme’ talebi – Son dakika haberi… Pusula Finans Holding AŞ, Tera Yatırım Menkul Değerler AŞ, Hedef Holding AŞ ve …
28. Sermaye piyasasında gerçekleştirilen işlemlere ilişkin soruşturmalar sürüyor
29. Fon soruşturması: Tera ve Pusula yöneticileri tutuklandı – Sermaye piyasası işlemlerine yönelik soruşturmada, Pusula Holding yöneticisi Serdar Turhan ile Tera …
30. Bakan Gürlek: Fon soruşturmasında 45 şüpheli tutuklandı – Adalet Bakanı Akın Gürlek, fon soruşturması kapsamında bugüne kadar 76 şüpheli hakkında adli işlem y…
31. Adalet Bakanı Gürlek: “Fon soruşturmasında 76 şüpheliye … – Adalet Bakanı Akın Gürlek, fon soruşturması kapsamında bugüne kadar 76 şüpheli hakkında adli işlem y…
32. Savcı Emre Tezmen’e sordu: Fon paraları Tera hisselerini yükseltmek için mi kullanıldı? – İstanbul Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı’nın yürüttüğü fon soruşturmasında Tera Grubu Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı…
33. Fon soruşturmasında Tera patronu Emre Tezmen ve eski … – Fon soruşturmasında tutuklanan Tera Grubu Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı Emre Tezmen ile eski Tera Portföy G…
34. Turkish firm Tera Portfoy says it is working to repay … – Tera Portfoy , a Turkish portfolio management firm under investigation after some investment funds d…
35. Fon soruşturmasında yeni ayrıntılar… İsviçre hesaplarına … – Fon soruşturmasında Serdar Turhan’ın hesabından İsviçre’deki bir hesaba 15 milyon dolar, Muhammed Ya…
36. TERA PORTFÖY YÖNETİMİ A.Ş. Şirket … – Tera Portföy Birinci ・ için verilen iade talimatlarının ödemesi 16,17 ve 18 Eylül 2026 tarihinde ger…
37. Özlem Yüzak yazdı : Fon vurgunu… Kimler biliyordu, kimler çıktı? | Cumhuriyet – Fon işi patlayalı günler oldu. Ortalık hâlâ toz duman. İşin buraya geleceği biliniyordu. Çok daha va…
38. Bakanlıktan Mehmet Şimşek ve Emre Tezmen iddialarına … – Hazine ve Maliye Bakanlığı, Mehmet Şimşek’in Emre Tezmen veya Tera Yatırım’la ticari bağı olduğu idd…
39. Fon krizinde SPK neden eleştiriliyor? – BBC News Türkçe – SPK’nın fon kriziyle ilgili açıklamaları 2025 yılının son mali çeyreğine kadar gidiyor. Konuyu doğru…
40. com.tr · turkiye · fon-vurgununda-gizemli-12-kisiFon vurgununda ‘gizemli 12 kişi’ gizemi! Tera foncuları hala kayı… – Fon skandalında ‘kayıp 12 kişi’ üzerindeki sis perdesi daha da kalınlaştı. Pusula’da yatırım yapan 1…
41. Turkish stocks slide in ‘fund run’ as investors withdraw $1bn – Two prominent Pusula funds surged 164 per cent and 144 per cent respectively in the first seven mont…
42. Türk piyasalarında fon skandalı: Tam olarak ne oluyor? – Perşembe günü SPK, 7 portföy yönetim şirketinin TEFAS elektronik fon platformunda işlem gören tüm ya…
43. Borsada göz göre göre gelen kaos! Yabancı basın Tera için 5 ay … – Küresel finans ajansı Bloomberg’in aylar önce Tera Yatırım ve bağlantılı fonları mercek altına aldığ…