I wanted to collect propaganda content for all sides during the war for the record. Here is what ChatGPT’s deep research found out. It looks like this is not just propaganda in the traditional sense, but a platform-native propaganda system, where states, semi-state actors, and meme producers operate within the same attention economy.
How I am using “propaganda” here
I am using the term broadly to mean persuasive war messaging designed to shape perception, whether through official state channels, military spokespersons, embassies, state-linked media, semi-official meme accounts, or highly produced viral clips. That includes material that may be partly factual but is selectively framed, emotionally stylized, triumphalist, humiliating, or manipulative. Both sides used this mix. (The Verge)
1) Iranian-side propaganda and influence content
A. Embassy and consulate meme diplomacy
One of the clearest Iranian patterns was the use of embassy-level social media accounts to post sarcastic, meme-like responses to U.S. messaging. Al Jazeera reported that Iranian missions in places including London, Pretoria, New Delhi, Moscow, and Zimbabwe joined a coordinated mocking campaign after Trump’s profane demand to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with posts framing him as unstable, vulgar, or ridiculous rather than strategically formidable. This is close to your example of Iranian consulates/embassies tweeting as propaganda actors rather than just diplomatic messengers. (Al Jazeera)
A more aggressive example was the circulation of an AI-edited “Jesus/hell” video mocking Trump after his own AI-religious posting. Multiple reports describe the clip as being shared by an Iranian diplomatic channel, and social posts described it as coming from an Iranian embassy or mission account. The point was not only ridicule but also to turn Trump’s religious symbolism against him in a shareable meme format. (The Daily Beast)
B. Lego-style / toy-style AI videos
This became the most recognizable Iranian propaganda format. The Verge, Wired, The New Yorker, and Al Jazeera all describe a viral stream of AI-generated Lego-style videos associated with Explosive Media / Akhbar Enfejari and amplified by Iranian or state-aligned channels. These clips caricatured Trump, Netanyahu, U.S. rescue operations, Gulf leaders, and Israeli targets, often mixing mockery, revenge fantasy, humor, and grief imagery. (The New Yorker)
The important point is that these were not just fringe memes. Reporting says they were redistributed by state-linked outlets such as Tasnim and Revayat-e Fath, and broader analyses argue that Iran’s wartime messaging ecosystem successfully fused real civilian suffering with AI satire, making the propaganda more emotionally sticky and internationally legible. (YouTube)
C. Victimhood framing through real destruction footage
Another major Iranian information strategy was to circulate high-definition footage of bombed neighborhoods, dead civilians, funerals, and school victims, framing Iran as the attacked society and the U.S./Israel as indiscriminate aggressors. Analyses in The Verge and the Guardian argue that this worked especially well because it blended authentic atrocity imagery with meme-native packaging, giving Iran stronger emotional traction online than the U.S. government’s more triumphalist content. (The Verge)
D. AI and fake battle-damage imagery
Iranian-side propaganda also included fabricated or misleading visuals. Multiple sources describe AI-generated satellite or battlefield imagery that purported to show destroyed U.S. or allied facilities, including a widely shared fake image of a devastated U.S. base/radar site in Qatar. Researchers highlighted this as a major example of wartime AI disinformation. (CEDMO)
There were also reports that an Iranian embassy in Austria shared a fake image tied to the Minab school attack, and that pro-Iran accounts circulated fake videos of missiles destroying Tel Aviv. These examples matter because they show that Iranian propaganda was not limited to satire; it also crossed into fabrication presented as evidence. (Wikipedia)
E. “Semi-official” meme warfare
Some of the most effective Iranian content seems to have lived in a gray zone between state and non-state. Explosive Media publicly framed itself as an independent creative group, but reporting shows its work was boosted by government-affiliated outlets, and analysts describe this as a hybrid ecosystem in which semi-state meme producers could say things official ministries could not. That gave Iran deniability while still benefiting from the reach. (The New Yorker)
2) U.S.-side propaganda and influence content
A. White House meme videos and “slopaganda”
Reuters reported that the White House and Pentagon used stylized videos on TikTok, Instagram, and X that mixed war footage with SpongeBob, Iron Man, Superman, Call of Duty, and action-film imagery. Critics described this as the gamification of war, but from an analytical perspective it is clearly propaganda: emotionally simplified, spectacle-driven messaging designed to sell the war through meme aesthetics rather than policy argument. (Reuters)
The White House also published a video titled “Justice the American Way”, which the Guardian and Reuters describe as part of a broader social-media strategy critics labeled “slopaganda.” Reuters specifically notes backlash to a White House video that spliced Iran-war footage with video game and action-movie scenes. (The White House)
B. Trump’s personal social media as war messaging
Reuters and other outlets describe Trump using social media rather than formal addresses for key war messaging, including ceasefire announcements and threats. His posts reportedly included threats to blow adversaries “to hell” and highly personalized, theatrical language. In propaganda terms, this turned the president’s own feed into a core distribution channel for intimidation, morale framing, and narrative dominance. (Reuters)
C. Religious imagery and messianic symbolism
A notable U.S. propaganda-adjacent pattern was the use of religious rhetoric and AI imagery around the war. Several reports connect the backlash against the Iranian “Jesus/hell” video to Trump’s own earlier AI-generated Christ-like image and to broader Christian-nationalist framing around the conflict. Even when not military in form, this kind of imagery functions propagandistically by sacralizing the war and presenting leadership as morally transcendent rather than politically accountable. (The Daily Beast)
3) Israeli-side propaganda and influence content
A. IDF Spokesperson’s Unit war-feed content
The IDF built a dedicated “Iran Videos” and “Iran-Israel War 2026” content stream with daily briefings, strike footage, live updates, and spokesperson clips. These materials present operations as precise, cumulative successes against “the Iranian terror regime and its proxies,” emphasizing discipline, legitimacy, and battlefield momentum. That is standard wartime propaganda in an official military format: less absurdist than the White House or Iranian meme sphere, but still highly curated and strategically framed. (IDF)
Examples include repeated publication of drone-strike and target footage, plus tightly scripted briefings by IDF spokesperson Effie Defrin presenting Israeli actions as controlled, necessary, and increasingly successful. (IDF)
B. Controlled access, selective leaks, and narrative management
+972 Magazine published a detailed account of what it calls the Israeli army’s “propaganda wing,” describing psy-ops, selective leaks, and curated access for journalists through the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit. That is not just a critique of tone; it suggests an institutional system for shaping the public story of the war beyond individual clips. This matters because Israeli propaganda in this conflict appears to have relied heavily on formal press discipline and narrative control, not only on memes. (+972 Magazine)
4) Shared techniques used by both sides
A. AI-generated visuals
Both camps used or circulated AI-generated war imagery, though often in different styles. Iran leaned more toward satire, animation, fake satellite images, and grief-centered virality; the U.S. leaned more toward meme edits and culture-war aesthetics; Israel leaned more toward official military video packaging. Analysts across outlets describe this as a new phase of AI-enabled propaganda rather than simple old-style state broadcasting. (The Verge)
B. Entertainment logic
A striking commonality is the conversion of war into shareable entertainment objects. On the Iranian side that meant Lego animations, AI songs, and meme irony. On the U.S. side it meant superhero clips, first-person-shooter aesthetics, and swagger edits. In both cases, the message was made more persuasive by making it more fun, quotable, and remixable. (The Verge)
C. Confusion between real and fake
The conflict also generated a flood of miscaptioned footage, AI images, fake damage assessments, and unrelated videos recirculated as war evidence. This matters analytically because propaganda here is not only about persuasion; it is also about epistemic overload. When users cannot tell which bombed school image is real and which base-destruction image is fake, the uncertainty itself becomes politically useful. (Wikipedia)
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