Türkiye’s Investment-Fund Scandal: TERA, Pusula and the September–October 2026 Fund Crisis

Status as of 6 October 2026. Türkiye is dealing with a large, still-unresolved capital-markets crisis centered on investment funds managed by Tera Portföy and Pusula Portföy, but extending to Atlas Portföy, Hedef Portföy, A1 Capital Portföy, Bulls Portföy and Pardus Portföy. On 17 September, the Capital Markets Board of Türkiye (SPK) put 131 funds into liquidation or related restrictive processes; SPK subsequently stated that those funds had 455,758 unique investors according to Central Securities Depository (MKK) records. The liquidation window, originally three months, was extended to six months. [1]

The most important fact is that the central allegation is not simply that some funds made bad investments. SPK itself says that from the final quarter of 2025 it observed certain portfolio-management companies’ hedge/equity and money-market funds causing price movements in low-free-float equities that could not be explained by economic reality or the issuers’ fundamentals. SPK further says its eventual reforms were designed to prevent systemic risk arising from unsecured related-party borrowing and extraordinary stock-price movements through funds, to restrict opportunities for manipulation, and to stop some fund values from being calculated “fictitiously.” These are unusually explicit statements from the regulator and provide the strongest official support for the proposition that the crisis had a structural manipulation/valuation dimension rather than being merely a liquidity accident. [2]

Public evidence is consistent with a reflexive mechanism: funds accumulated unusually large positions in thinly traded shares; rising share prices raised reported fund NAVs and advertised returns; those returns attracted substantial new money; the new inflows could sustain further purchases until regulatory changes, falling prices and redemptions exposed the underlying liquidity mismatch. Reuters reports that Tera’s assets under management increased more than tenfold and Pusula’s thirteenfold in the year to August 2026, while some funds became highly concentrated in individual securities. Tera’s TLY fund reportedly generated cumulative lira returns above 15,000% by September and reached about $5 billion with more than 102,000 investors; TP2 reached about $4.6 billion and roughly 167,000 investors. These figures help explain both the attractiveness of the products and the eventual systemic scale. [3]

There is also unusually concrete transactional evidence. A 19 August 2026 KAP filing by Pusula Portföy states that Pusula-managed funds held 38.6699% of Gündoğdu Gıda (GUNDG) after purchases on 18 August, with voting rights exceeding 20%. That does not by itself establish manipulation, but it is powerful documentary evidence of the extreme concentration that regulators later identified as problematic. [4]

Criminal investigations have expanded dramatically. SPK referred suspected manipulation involving Katılımevim (KTLEV), Gündoğdu Gıda (GUNDG) and Destek Finans Faktoring (DSTKF) to prosecutors and imposed trading restrictions on dozens of people, according to Reuters. By 30 September, Justice Minister Akın Gürlek said the wider investigation involved 217 suspects, 56 then in pre-trial detention. The latest public figure located for this report is materially higher: Anadolu Agency reported on 6 October that, after successive detention orders, 85 people were in pre-trial detention, including senior Tera and Pusula figures. No conviction should be inferred: tutuklama is pre-trial detention, not a guilty verdict. [5]

The investigation has also moved into possible money laundering and asset-transfer tracing. A 17 September prosecutor’s request to MASAK sought raw financial data for managers of Pusula Finans Holding, Tera Yatırım Menkul Değerler, Hedef Holding, Bulls Yatırım and subsidiaries, including all incoming/outgoing money and foreign and crypto-asset transfers from 2024 onward. The existence of this request proves that those flows are under investigation; it does not prove that they were illicit. [6]

The strongest “cover-up” evidence is narrower than some political claims suggest. There is solid evidence of regulatory delay and information restrictions, but not yet public proof of a coordinated criminal cover-up. SPK acknowledges that the problematic fund behavior was identified in late 2025 and discussed by the Financial Stability Committee on 2 December 2025, yet the final fund guideline did not appear until 28 August 2026, followed by mass intervention on 17 September. SPK says the intervening period involved consultation, TEFAS changes and valuation reforms; critics argue the delay allowed the bubble to become much larger. [2] Separately, access to hundreds of X accounts and several news reports discussing the crisis was restricted in late September, with national security/public order cited in at least some cases. Reuters reported at least 147 additional X accounts blocked on 30 September after an earlier wave of roughly 150; journalists and the Freedom of Expression Association characterized the restrictions as censorship. That is documented suppression of access to information, but evidence that the purpose was specifically to conceal criminal responsibility has not been made public. [7]

Political allegations require especially careful treatment. Former AK Party deputy chair Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya resigned after opposition allegations concerning profitable trading ahead of the turmoil. On 6 October, prosecutors confirmed that Kaya and her husband had applied under SPK’s voluntary repayment mechanism, and prosecutors instructed seven banks to permit transfers from accounts named in their applications to Birleşik Fon Bankası. This is a significant factual development, but neither the application nor repayment is in itself an admission of insider trading or criminal liability. [8]

Finally, the often-quoted “$18 billion” or “$20 billion scandal” is not a demonstrated investor-loss figure. Financial Times described roughly $18 billion of assets in the implicated funds, while Reuters put the amount above $20 billion. SPK has not, in the material reviewed here, published a final aggregate loss. The liquidation value depends on what the underlying securities can actually be sold for; therefore assets under management, nominal fund value and investor losses must not be conflated. [9]

Entities, funds and the alleged mechanism

The seven portfolio managers

SPK’s 17 September bulletin enumerates 131 affected funds. Counting the numbered entries in the official schedule gives the following distribution; the counts are therefore an inference directly from SPK’s numbered list, rather than a separate SPK statistic. [10]

The crisis should therefore not be described as simply a “TERA fund collapse.” Tera and Pusula appear to be the principal centers of the investigation and the most striking growth stories, but the regulatory intervention covers a much wider network. Reuters says that by August 2026 Tera and Pusula had become the two largest non-bank portfolio-management groups in Türkiye, each exceeding 4% of industry assets; Tera’s AUM was about $14.3 billion and Pusula’s about $13.2 billion. [3]

Tera itself sits within a broader financial group that publicly lists businesses including securities brokerage, portfolio management, banking and factoring. [19] That broader-group exposure has become increasingly important: BDDK’s announcement lists on 30 September and 1 October contain decisions concerning Tera Yatırım Bankası, Hedef Yatırım Bankası, Destek Yatırım Bankası, Tera Finans Faktoring and Destek Finans Faktoring, while contemporary reporting says control/management measures involving TMSF followed. [20]

What the suspected mechanism looks like

A useful distinction is between what is officially established as a regulatory concern and what prosecutors must still prove as a crime.

SPK says it had observed, particularly through hedge funds and money-market funds, price movements in low-free-float stocks that could not be reconciled with economic reality or issuer fundamentals. It subsequently described systemic risk from unsecured related-party borrowing and abnormal stock-price moves through funds, and said a July valuation reform prevented some funds from calculating their value “fictitiously.” [2]

Reuters’ reconstruction adds the suspected economic mechanism: certain funds became concentrated in recently listed or small-cap shares; because these shares had limited liquidity, relatively concentrated purchases could cause large price movements; higher equity prices then increased the funds’ reported daily returns, attracting further investor inflows. [3]

One primary-source example is striking. Pusula disclosed that, after 18 August transactions, its managed funds collectively controlled 38.6699% of Gündoğdu Gıda’s capital and more than 20% of its voting rights. [4] Again, concentration is not itself criminal. But in a low-free-float security, it creates precisely the feedback and exit-liquidity problem about which SPK later spoke.

This diagram represents the alleged/reflexive mechanism described by regulators and Reuters; arrows should not be read as findings that every manager, fund or transaction was criminal. [21]

Timeline of the crisis

The central analytical point in this chronology is the long gap between recognition and intervention. SPK says it identified the phenomenon in late 2025, while the final comprehensive guideline arrived in August 2026 and the mass liquidation in September. SPK’s defense is procedural and technical: it says TEFAS mechanics had to be redesigned, Borsa İstanbul/Takasbank/MKK/TSPB views obtained and valuation rules changed sequentially. Whether that timetable was reasonably cautious rulemaking or damaging regulatory forbearance is one of the most important unresolved questions. [2]

Allegations, evidence and legal status

Market manipulation through investment funds

The allegation with the strongest official foundation is that funds were used to facilitate abnormal prices in low-free-float shares. SPK itself says exactly that it observed fund-driven price movements inconsistent with fundamentals; Reuters subsequently reported SPK criminal referrals and two-year transaction bans related to alleged manipulation in KTLEV, GUNDG and DSTKF, including measures involving Pusula. [32]

The evidence publicly visible so far is circumstantial and transactional rather than a complete criminal proof package: extraordinary concentration, extraordinary returns, trading in thin-float securities, regulatory findings about artificial valuation risk, and fund liquidity failures. The Pusula/GUNDG disclosure is particularly useful because it comes directly from KAP rather than anonymous claims. [4]

What remains publicly missing is the evidence necessary to prove manipulative intent: synchronized order logs, beneficial-owner mappings, communications between managers and counterparties, instructions to brokers, matched trades, financing agreements and forensic evidence showing that the objective of trades was to create an artificial price rather than make an investment. Reuters reports a widening probe involving multiple securities, but those underlying forensic files are not public. [3]

Artificial or unreliable fund valuation

SPK’s own formulation is unusually strong. When explaining the July valuation reform, it said the change prevented certain funds from calculating values fictitiously. The Board also says the August guideline was designed to limit manipulation through funds and address systemic risks created by extraordinary price movements. [2]

That does not automatically mean that every high historical NAV was fraudulent. An illiquid security can have a quoted exchange price that is formally observable yet economically impossible to realize for a large holder. The crucial forensic question is therefore whether NAVs were merely mechanically overstated because of market illiquidity, deliberately engineered by trading, or knowingly misrepresented to new investors. The public record has not yet resolved that distinction. Reuters notes that the ultimate investor loss will depend heavily on the prices at which the illiquid underlying assets can actually be sold. [3]

Fraud, criminal organization and “Ponzi” allegations

Financial Times has characterized the case as an alleged $18 billion Ponzi-like scheme and reported that senior Tera figures were detained in an investigation involving allegations including aggravated fraud and membership in a criminal organization. [33]

“Ponzi” should nevertheless be treated as a journalistic characterization at this stage, not a court finding. A classical Ponzi scheme uses new investor money directly to pay earlier investors while falsely claiming external investment profits. The mechanism reported here appears more complex: genuine securities existed, but the allegation is that their prices and therefore fund NAVs may have been artificially inflated, with new fund inflows sustaining a reflexive cycle. Economically the dynamics can become Ponzi-like without satisfying every legal or factual characteristic of a conventional Ponzi scheme. The published prosecutorial record available to this research does not yet contain a final indictment establishing that theory. [34]

Money laundering, foreign transfers and crypto assets

The prosecutor’s MASAK request is concrete evidence of the investigation’s direction. It seeks identification and financial data for managers connected with Pusula Finans Holding, Tera Yatırım, Hedef Holding and Bulls Yatırım and affiliates, including transfers abroad, crypto-asset transfers and all money inflows/outflows from 2024 onward. [6]

It is important not to turn that investigative request into a conclusion. Asking MASAK to trace overseas/crypto flows means prosecutors are testing whether proceeds were moved, concealed or laundered. It does not demonstrate that the transfers were criminal proceeds.

The individuals and current procedural status

AA’s 6 October account names among those placed in pre-trial detention Emre Tezmen, Emre Alkin, Kerem Alkin, Alper Öztürk, Serdar Turhan, Muhammed Yarız, Namık Kemal Gökalp, Altunç Kumova, İbrahim Bekçi, Nihat Kırmızı, Bülent Uygun, Abdulkadir Özkan, and subsequently Emir Münir Sarpyener and Erdin Özel, among others. AA says the total number in pre-trial detention has reached 85. [6]

The essential legal qualification is that none of those detentions is a conviction. I located no publicly accessible final indictment and no merits judgment resolving the central manipulation/fraud allegations as of 6 October. The investigation is continuing. Earlier Reuters figures—217 suspects and 56 in pre-trial detention as of 30 September—should therefore be understood as a snapshot that was overtaken by subsequent operations. [35]

Allegations versus official response

Cover-up claims, political connections and the regulatory response

The strongest case for regulatory failure

The regulator’s own chronology is more damaging—and more informative—than much of the political rhetoric. SPK says concerns were already evident in the last quarter of 2025, were considered by the Financial Stability Committee on 2 December, and produced a working group the following day. Yet Tera and Pusula continued to expand dramatically through August 2026; Reuters says their AUM rose more than tenfold and thirteenfold respectively over the year. [21]

This creates a legitimate supervisory question: why were firm-specific enforcement measures not taken earlier if regulators had already identified the core conduct?

SPK’s public explanation deserves to be taken seriously. It says the problem required interconnected changes to TEFAS settlement, valuation, qualified-investor standards and portfolio rules; it consulted Borsa İstanbul, Takasbank, MKK, TSPB and the Ministry and introduced some reforms before the final August guideline. [2] That explains why rulemaking took time, but it does not fully answer a separate question: whether existing enforcement powers could have been used against individual funds/managers while the general rulebook was still being rewritten.

FT additionally reported criticism that a 2025 prosecutorial letter and warnings from former financial-crimes official Ramazan Başak had failed to trigger timely action. [33] I did not locate the underlying prosecutor letter itself in the public primary-source record reviewed for this report, so the content, recipients and precise follow-up cannot independently be verified here. This should be treated as an important investigative lead, not yet as proven evidence that regulators deliberately ignored a specific criminal warning.

Access blocking and the “cover-up” question

The information-control component is considerably better documented. Reuters reported on 30 September that at least 147 more X accounts discussing the crisis had been blocked in Türkiye, following an earlier wave of around 150. EngelliWeb said affected users included finance professionals, economists, academics, analysts, traders, investors and lawyers. Neither the Justice Ministry nor X provided Reuters an immediate explanation. [41]

Separately, İFÖD/EngelliWeb reported access blocks on crisis-related news stories concerning connections between financial-company executives/owners and prominent people, under Law No. 5651 Article 8/A, citing national security and public order. [42]

That establishes censorship/access restriction, but it does not by itself establish the mens rea required for a cover-up. There are at least three distinct propositions that should not be merged:

1. authorities restricted information about the crisis — documented;
2. those restrictions reduced public scrutiny during a politically sensitive investigation — a reasonable inference;
3. the restrictions were ordered specifically to conceal criminal participation by officials — not established by the public evidence reviewed. [43]

Political trading allegations

The most consequential political case publicly identified concerns Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya and her husband. Opposition politicians alleged unusually profitable Özata Denizcilik transactions before the market downturn; published estimates of purchase cost and sale proceeds have differed across reports, so those precise numbers should not be treated as established facts. Kaya subsequently resigned from her AK Party role, saying political responsibility required the allegations to be clarified. [26]

The 6 October development is more concrete: AA reports that Kaya and İlyas Kaya filed applications under SPK’s voluntary-payment procedure, and the İstanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office wrote to seven banks concerning transfer of amounts specified in their petitions to Birleşik Fon Bankası. [6]

SPK’s voluntary-return system is itself notable. It created designated accounts for people who made what the Board describes as “excessive gains” from selling fund units before liquidation, and another mechanism for excessive gains from equity or similar transactions; money returned goes into the liquidation estate and ultimately toward fund investors. [29]

Analytically, this is stronger than a mere rumor that “insiders got out”: the regulator has formally created a mechanism specifically to claw money back voluntarily from unusually profitable exits. But who had privileged information, if anyone, and whether those gains constituted insider trading or manipulation are separate evidentiary questions.

SPK’s investor-protection measures

SPK has progressively moved from freezing transactions to orderly liquidation. Orders on 17 September for affected funds were cancelled after the funds were closed to trading; even some earlier redemption instructions that had not settled because of defaults or pricing failures were folded into liquidation claims. Investors will therefore receive their entitlements from the liquidation estate rather than through normal daily redemption. [44]

The liquidation period was increased from three months to six because SPK said portfolio structures and market conditions required more time for orderly sales. This is financially meaningful: forced sales of concentrated positions in thinly traded stocks could crystallize far greater losses than a controlled liquidation. [45]

On 1 October, SPK introduced an interim payment for investors in Tera, Pusula, Atlas and Hedef liquidation funds. MKK is to calculate each holder’s “net investment”; investors below TL1 million can receive that net-investment amount, while those at or above TL1 million can receive at most TL1 million per investor, per fund as an interim payment, beginning with money-market funds. These payments are advances against the eventual liquidation entitlement, not guaranteed compensation for every claimed market loss. [28]

Financial impact, unresolved questions and investigative priorities

What can and cannot currently be quantified

The distinction between gross assets, inflated NAV, realizable liquidation value and investor loss is critical. For example, if an illiquid share has a quoted exchange price of X but a fund owns such a large position that it can only sell at a fraction of X, the last published NAV can substantially overstate recoverable value without the entire NAV necessarily being “lost.” That is precisely why the liquidation price discovery process matters so much. SPK’s six-month extension implicitly recognizes this problem, and Reuters states that the final loss remains unknowable until the assets are monetized. [45]

The biggest unanswered questions

Who ultimately benefited from the price cycle? The most important missing dataset is a beneficial-owner-level transaction map covering the relevant shares and fund units. Investigators need to establish who sold into fund buying, who redeemed before freezes, whether connected parties consistently exited at advantageous prices, and whether those gains correlate with access to non-public information. SPK’s voluntary-return mechanism indicates that this issue is already central to the official response. [29]

How interconnected were the seven portfolio managers? The public discussion often treats Tera, Pusula, Hedef, Bulls, Pardus, Atlas and A1 as one phenomenon, but a common liquidation decision does not prove a single common conspiracy. A rigorous investigation requires trade-counterparty matrices, common beneficial owners, cross-fund investments, lending arrangements, shared brokers, directors, collateral and related-party exposures.

Why were firm-specific measures delayed after late-2025 warnings? SPK’s chronology establishes knowledge of the underlying phenomenon by late 2025. The decisive accountability question is whether internal inspections, surveillance alerts or enforcement recommendations identified specific managers much earlier than September 2026, and if so, what happened to those recommendations. [2]

What exactly did the alleged 2025 prosecutor warning say? FT’s report of an earlier prosecutor letter is potentially central to any cover-up/regulatory-negligence thesis, but the primary document is not publicly available in the sources located here. [33] Obtaining its date, addressees, annexes, requested action and institutional replies should be a priority.

Were fund valuations compliant but economically misleading, or intentionally falsified? SPK’s reference to preventing “fictitious” valuation is serious, but the criminal significance depends on the valuation chain: which prices administrators used, whether managers influenced those prices, what custodians and independent auditors saw, and whether investor disclosures adequately described concentration and liquidity risk. [2]

What were the precise cash flows behind redemptions? To determine whether the structure was genuinely Ponzi-like, investigators need daily subscriptions/redemptions, cash balances, securities purchases, margin/credit facilities and payments to departing investors. Without that, “Ponzi” remains an analogy rather than a demonstrated financial architecture. [9]

What was the role of associated banks and factoring companies? BDDK’s late-September/October actions involving Tera, Hedef and Destek financial institutions, followed by Tera Yatırım Bankası’s reported 5 October debt-payment failure, raise the possibility of balance-sheet spillovers or intra-group funding links. Publicly available information is not yet sufficient to establish whether those institutions financed the fund-equity cycle or simply became collateral damage from the crisis. [46]

What explains the access-blocking campaign? The orders, their requesting authorities, court files, exact URLs/accounts, legal reasoning and any appeals should be assembled in one database. The existence of restrictions is documented; proving an institutional cover-up would require showing a connection between the persons protected by those orders and the substance/timing of the criminal investigation. [43]

Recommended next investigative steps

The highest-value next step is a transaction-level forensic reconstruction, not further reliance on political statements. The key dataset would merge KAP beneficial-ownership disclosures, MKK fund-holder records, Borsa İstanbul order/trade records, TEFAS subscriptions and redemptions, custodial records, Takasbank settlement failures, fund portfolio reports and related-party corporate ownership. For each suspected stock—starting with GUNDG, KTLEV and DSTKF, then expanding to the wider set identified by prosecutors—the analysis should reconstruct who bought, who sold, at what price, and whether the same economic beneficiaries appear on opposite sides of fund transactions. The Pusula/GUNDG disclosure demonstrates how revealing this approach can be. [47]

A second priority is to obtain the actual investigative and regulatory paper trail: SPK inspection reports from 2025–26; the reported 2025 prosecutor letter; Financial Stability Committee materials; correspondence between SPK, Borsa İstanbul, Takasbank, MKK and the Ministry; any criminal complaints filed under Capital Markets Law Article 107; detention/search/seizure rulings; MASAK analytical reports; and eventually the prosecutor’s indictment. Until those documents are public, many person-specific allegations remain impossible to assess independently.

Third, investigators should compare redemption timing against information access. The appropriate test is not merely “who made money?” but whether officials, directors, politically exposed persons or related parties sold fund units or underlying shares shortly before regulatory freezes, liquidity failures or undisclosed enforcement actions, and whether their timing is statistically abnormal. SPK’s voluntary-return mechanism and the Kaya applications make this an especially important line of inquiry. [48]

Fourth, independent scrutiny should focus on gatekeepers: custodians, fund administrators, brokers, independent auditors, valuation functions, compliance officers and SPK surveillance teams. If NAVs depended on securities that funds themselves dominated, the central governance question is who knew that quoted market prices could not support large-scale liquidation and what they disclosed to investors.

Finally, any analysis of political or institutional responsibility should maintain three separate categories: documented conduct, formal allegation/investigative suspicion, and proven criminal liability. At present, documented facts include extraordinary concentration, regulatory warnings dating to 2025, mass fund liquidation, extensive criminal investigation, financial-flow tracing, voluntary-return mechanisms and widespread information restrictions. Allegations of deliberate insider exits, an organized Ponzi conspiracy and intentional governmental cover-up are serious and in some cases supported by suggestive evidence, but they remain allegations until transaction records, communications and court findings establish the required intent and coordination. [49]

Bottom line: the public record already supports a strong conclusion that Türkiye experienced a systemic failure involving dangerously concentrated funds, abnormal low-float equity pricing, questionable valuation dynamics, severe liquidity mismatch and inadequate or belated supervisory containment. SPK’s own retrospective description makes that difficult to dispute. [2] What the public record does not yet establish is the full criminal architecture: who intentionally manipulated which securities, who knowingly benefited, whether new investor money was deliberately used to sustain a Ponzi-type cycle, and whether officials merely responded too slowly or actively protected participants. Those are now the decisive questions for prosecutors, courts and any serious independent investigation.

[1] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [23] [37] spk.gov.tr

https://spk.gov.tr/data/6aac56ff8f95db07100fd82d/2026-61.pdf

[2] [21] [32] [34] [36] [39] [40] [49] Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Yatırım Fonlarına İlişkin Rehber Düzenleme Süreci Açıklaması

https://spk.gov.tr/duyurular/basin-duyurulari/2026/yatirim-fonlarina-iliskin-rehber-duzenleme-surecine-iliskin-aciklama

[3] Explainer: How Turkey’s investment fund bubble burst | Reuters

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-turkeys-investment-fund-bubble-burst-2026-10-02/

[4] [47] KAP

https://www.kap.org.tr/tr/Bildirim/1652894

[5] Turkish watchdog files complaints, orders trading bans over share manipulation

https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/turkish-watchdog-files-complaints-apply-trading-bans-share-manipulation-2026-09-17/

[6] Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya ve eşinin hesaplarındaki miktarların Birleşik Fon Bankasına gönderilmesi için yazı yazıldı

https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/fatma-betul-sayan-kaya-ve-esinin-hesaplarindaki-miktarlarin-birlesik-fon-bankasina-gonderilmesi-icin-yazi-yazildi/4079086

[7] [41] [43] Turkey blocks 147 more X accounts over fund crisis posts, monitoring group says | Reuters

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-blocks-147-more-x-accounts-over-fund-crisis-posts-monitoring-group-says-2026-09-30/

[8] [26] [38] Deputy chair of Turkey’s AK Party resigns after trading allegation amid funds crisis

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/deputy-chair-turkeys-ak-party-resigns-after-trading-allegation-amid-funds-crisis-2026-09-27/

[9] [33] Turkey arrests founder of brokerage at centre of $18bn alleged Ponzi scheme

https://www.ft.com/content/65d0e5d1-c4cc-4849-ad50-b260ccfde7b9

[18] Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Tasfiye Konusu Fonlardaki Yatırımcı Sayısına İlişkin Açıklama

https://spk.gov.tr/duyurular/basin-duyurulari/2026/tasfiye-konusu-fonlardaki-yatirimci-sayisina-iliskin-aciklama

[19] Tera Holding | Finans, Teknoloji ve Sürdürülebilir Çözümler

https://teraholding.com.tr/

[20] [30] [46] Duyuru Listesi

https://www.bddk.org.tr/Duyuru/Liste

[22] KAP

https://kap.org.tr/tr/bildirim-sorgu-sonuc?member=8acae2c58b2fa64e018c4892184924cb

[24] [45] Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Tasfiye Konusu Fonlara İlişkin Süre Düzenlemesi

https://spk.gov.tr/duyurular/basin-duyurulari/2026/tasfiye-konusu-fonlara-iliskin-sure-duzenlemesi

[25] [42] cumhuriyet.com.tr

https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/News/DetailNextNews/2540758

[27] [35] Turkey orders detention of 34 more suspects in widening investment fund probe

https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/turkey-orders-detention-34-more-suspects-widening-investment-fund-probe-2026-09-30/

[28] Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Tasfiyedeki Fonlara İlişkin Ara Ödeme Duyurusu

https://spk.gov.tr/duyurular/basin-duyurulari/2026/tasfiyedeki-fonlara-iliskin-ara-odeme-duyurusu

[29] [48] Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – İsteğe Bağlı İade Hesaplarına İlişkin Duyuru

https://spk.gov.tr/duyurular/basin-duyurulari/2026/istege-bagli-iade-hesaplarina-iliskin-duyuru

[31] TERA Yatırım Bankası temerrüde düştü, 5 milyar TL’lik …

https://gazeteoksijen.com/turkiye/tera-yatirim-bankasi-temerrude-dustu-5-milyar-tllik-bono-odemesini-yapamadi-291754

[44] Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Tasfiye Süresine İlişkin Basın Duyurusu

https://spk.gov.tr/duyurular/basin-duyurulari/2026/tasfiye-suresine-iliskin-basin-duyurusu