I recently saw a news On the rare earth element reserves in western Turkish town of Beylikova: What is known and what remains unknown and decided to make a deep research about the reserves thanks to ChatGPT.

Rare Earth Element Reserves in Turkey: Current State and Historical Development

Turkey has recently emerged in the spotlight of rare earth elements (REEs) due to a major discovery that positions it among the countries with the largest reserves. In 2022, officials announced the discovery of a vast rare earth reserve in Beylikova (Eskişehir province) estimated at 694 million tons of ore, which would make it the world’s second-largest REE reserve after China’s Bayan Obo deposit (about 800 million tons)[1][2]. This discovery has significant implications for Turkey’s industry and geopolitical strategy, given the critical role of REEs in high-tech, energy, and defense sectors. The following report provides a comprehensive overview of the types of REEs found in Turkey, current reserve estimates from various sources, historical trends since the founding of the Republic (1923) to present, key mining locations and projects, and the economic as well as strategic implications of these resources.

An Eti Maden official at the Beylikova site in Eskişehir presents a comparison of global rare earth reserves, highlighting Turkey’s newly identified 694-million-ton deposit as the world’s second-largest.

Rare Earth Elements in Turkey: Light vs. Heavy REEs

Rare earth elements comprise 17 metallic elements – the 15 lanthanides plus yttrium and scandium – which are often categorized into light and heavy REEs based on their atomic weight and properties[3]. Turkey’s known rare earth deposits contain a broad spectrum of these elements, including both light and heavy REEs. Notably, the Beylikova deposit in Eskişehir is reported to contain all 17 rare earth elements[4]. This deposit is particularly rich in light REEs such as lanthanum (La), cerium (Ce), and neodymium (Nd)[5], which are among the more abundant rare elements globally. Heavy REEs (like dysprosium, terbium, europium, yttrium, etc.), while present in Turkey’s ores, tend to occur in lower concentrations; however, certain deposits show a relative enrichment in heavy REEs. For example, the Çanaklı placer-sands deposit in the Isparta/Burdur region is noted as being HREE-rich compared to other Turkish occurrences[6]. In summary, exploration to date indicates that Turkey’s geology hosts the full range of REEs – from light elements such as La, Ce, Pr, Nd to heavier ones like Gd, Dy, and Y – albeit with varying abundance. This diversity means Turkey’s reserves have the potential to supply many different REE types, which is advantageous given the different industrial uses of light vs. heavy REEs (discussed later).

(Light REEs typically include La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, and sometimes Gd; Heavy REEs include the rest: Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, plus Y and Sc grouped with them in practice[3].)

Major REE Deposits and Reserve Estimates in Turkey

Turkey’s rare earth resources are concentrated in a few key deposits that have been the focus of recent exploration and development. Current reserve estimates come primarily from government announcements (notably by the Ministry of Energy and state mining enterprise Eti Maden) and are being scrutinized by independent experts. Table 1 below summarizes the major known REE deposits in Turkey, their estimated reserves, and characteristics:

Table 1: Major rare-earth element deposits in Turkey – reserve estimates and characteristics. (TREO = total rare earth oxides by weight. REO content in Beylikova’s 694 Mt ore is roughly estimated at 0.2–2% of the ore[8], i.e. on the order of 10 million tons REO, whereas placer and clay deposits have lower percentages. Figures are based on government reports and geological studies as cited.)

The Beylikova (Eskişehir) deposit is by far the flagship of Turkey’s rare earth reserves. This deposit (sometimes referred to historically as the Kızılcaören rare earth–fluorite–barite–thorium deposit, near Sivrihisar) was confirmed by drilling campaigns to contain 694 million tons of rare-earth-bearing ore[1]. The ore hosts a mix of rare-earth minerals (such as bastnäsite and monazite, common in carbonatite-related REE deposits) and significant fluorite (calcium fluoride) and barite (barium sulfate) which can be valuable by-products[9]. Notably, the deposit also has associated thorium (Th), with samples averaging ~0.1% ThO₂[23] – an important detail because thorium is a radioactive element that poses both an opportunity (as a nuclear fuel source) and a challenge in terms of radioactive waste management. According to Turkey’s Energy Ministry and Eti Maden, the plan is to develop Beylikova in stages: an initial pilot plant (opened in 2023) to process 1,200 tons of ore per year, followed by a full-scale industrial processing facility capable of 570,000 tons of ore/year, yielding an output of about 10,000 tons of REO annually (plus 72,000 tons of barite, 70,000 tons of fluorite, and 250 tons of thorium per year as by-products)[24][25]. This would make Turkey one of only a handful of countries producing separated rare earth oxides at scale[26]. The government has stated that 10 out of the 17 REEs are deemed economically recoverable from Beylikova with current plans[11] – though it has not publicly specified which 10, they likely include the most abundant and in-demand elements (e.g. lanthanum, cerium, neodymium, praseodymium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, dysprosium, etc., along with yttrium). Independent geologists caution that while the resource is very large, the recoverable reserve (the economically extractable REOs) may be a fraction of the 694 million tons of ore. Estimates suggest Turkey’s find could contain on the order of 14 million tons of rare earth oxides if one assumes roughly 2% average grade[8] – a very significant quantity, but not larger than China’s total REO reserves (China is estimated to have ~44 million tons REO)[27]. In essence, Turkey’s Beylikova deposit is substantial and geologically comparable to major Chinese deposits[28], but its practical impact will depend on the grade and Turkey’s ability to process the ore (discussed further below).

Apart from Beylikova, Turkey’s other known REE deposits are smaller in scale but could be important for specific elements, especially heavy REEs. The Çanaklı deposit in the Isparta–Burdur area (sometimes referred to as the Aksu Diamas project) is a placer deposit where heavy-mineral sands accumulated from weathering of REE-bearing volcanic rocks[29][30]. It has an estimated 80 million tons of ore in one zone (averaging ~808 ppm TREO) and 414 million tons in an adjacent zone (averaging ~627 ppm TREO)[12]. While the overall REE concentration is much lower than at Beylikova, the mineral assemblage at Çanaklı includes relatively higher proportions of heavy rare earths and other critical minerals (Ti, Zr). If developed, Çanaklı could provide elements like dysprosium or terbium (used in high-temperature magnets and lasers) which are less abundant in Beylikova’s mainly light-REE deposit. This project is still in exploration/pre-feasibility stages, initially studied with EU collaboration as a potential new REE source in Europe[31][32].

In Malatya (Kuluncak), central-eastern Turkey, another noteworthy REE occurrence is associated with a carbonatite intrusion. The Kuluncak–Başören deposit contains REEs in fluorite veins and breccias. It has a higher grade (0.3–0.7% TREO in studied samples) than Çanaklı, but its total size appears more limited[14][15]. Researchers from Istanbul Technical University and Turkey’s Rare Earth Research Institute (NATEN) have recently conducted beneficiation experiments on Kuluncak ore, finding it technically challenging to concentrate the REEs due to the minerals being finely disseminated in silicate gangue[17][18]. The studies achieved only modest improvements in concentrate grade (from ~0.33% to ~0.6–0.8% TREO) and low recovery rates, indicating that significant R&D is needed to make this deposit economically viable[33][34]. Nonetheless, such research is a critical step in Turkey’s strategy to develop a domestic REE supply chain.

In addition to these primary deposits, Turkey has minor REE resources in other regions. Some examples include small fluorite-REE veins in Sivas and Elazığ provinces (e.g. near Divriği and Keban), and adsorption-type heavy REE enrichment in lateritic clays/bauxites in the Taurus Mountains. For instance, laterite clays at Bolkardağ (Niğde–Adana region) contain up to ~1500–1700 ppm total REEs with a distribution similar to the ion-adsorption clays of southern China (which are a source of heavy REEs)[35][36]. However, these are not yet developed and would require extensive exploration to quantify. The Turkish Geological Survey (MTA) has also noted trace REE content in phosphate rock from Mazıdağı, but at only tens of ppm level[21][22], which is far too low to be of economic interest. Overall, aside from the flagship Beylikova deposit, Turkey’s other REE occurrences underscore the breadth of geological environments (carbonatite, placer, laterite, phosphorite) in which REEs occur, even if they are not all currently economic.

Historical Timeline of Rare Earth Exploration and Usage in Turkey (1923–2025)

Turkey’s engagement with rare earth elements has evolved gradually over the past century, accelerating markedly in recent years. Below is a timeline of major developments and trends from 1923 to present:

• 1923–1950s (Early Republic): In the first decades of the Turkish Republic, rare earth elements were not a known focus of mining or industry. REEs had very limited applications globally at the time, and Turkey’s mining sector was more concentrated on traditional minerals (coal, iron, chromium, etc.). There are no documented uses or production of REEs in Turkey during this period.
• Late 1950s: First discovery of REE-bearing minerals in Turkey. Geological surveys by MTA in the late 1950s identified unusual mineralization containing rare earths (and thorium) in the Kızılcaören area of Eskişehir (Sivrihisar)[37]. This can be considered the birth of rare-earth exploration in Turkey. The find was likely related to thorium exploration, as Turkey was investigating radioactive minerals (thorium and uranium) in that era. Indeed, Kızılcaören’s REE deposit is thorium-rich, which made it detectable with radiometric methods.
• 1960s–1970s: Further exploration and research. Through the 1960s and early 1970s, Turkey conducted sporadic investigations into its rare earth occurrences. By the early 1970s, MTA had produced reports on rare earth prospects[38], though no commercial development ensued. During this time, global REE use was still small (e.g. in color televisions and some alloys), and Turkey had no pressing demand or technology to exploit its finds. The Kızılcaören deposit remained known in academic circles; some research was published on its mineralogy. However, no mining was initiated, partly because richer and more accessible REE sources existed elsewhere (e.g. the Mountain Pass mine in the USA was then the world’s main supplier).
• 1980s–1990s: Limited activity and import dependence. In these decades, REEs became important in catalysts and new electronics globally, but Turkey’s role was purely as an end-user. The country’s growing industries (such as electronics, glass, metallurgy, and defense) imported REE-containing components (magnets, catalysts, phosphors) primarily from abroad (ultimately sourced from China or the US). Domestically, mining efforts focused on other strategic minerals like boron (where Turkey holds a world-leading reserve) and energy minerals. The rare earth deposits (Eskişehir, Isparta, etc.) were not developed, likely due to technical difficulty and the absence of refining infrastructure. Towards the late 1990s, as China’s dominance in rare earths became apparent, Turkish authorities and researchers began noting the strategic potential of its dormant REE resources, but still, no mines or processing facilities were established.
• 2000s: Renewed interest and initial projects. The 21st century brought a surge in global demand for REEs (driven by high-tech and green energy applications). In Turkey, the rare earth topic gained more attention in policy and academic circles. The government listed REEs among strategic minerals for development. During the 2000s, some laboratory-scale extraction studies were done on Kızılcaören ore and others, and MTA continued to catalog occurrences. A significant policy change came in 2004–2005, when Turkey revised its mining laws – data gathered by MTA on many deposits (including REEs) started being transferred to or managed by state companies or kept for strategic use[39][40]. This reduced public access to detailed REE data but signaled that the state was taking REEs seriously as a strategic resource.
• 2011: Launch of the Beylikova drilling program. The most concrete step toward utilizing REEs began around 2011, when state-owned Eti Maden (known for borate mining) was tasked to systematically explore the Beylikova (Eskişehir) field[41]. Over the next six years (2011–2017), an extensive campaign of 125,000 meters of drilling and tens of thousands of geochemical analyses were carried out on the site[42][43]. This effort, conducted somewhat quietly, dramatically improved knowledge of the deposit’s size and composition. By the end of this period, internal reports indicated a very large reserve was present[44].
• 2017–2019: Preparation for production. As results from Beylikova proved promising, Turkey moved to the development phase. Plans were made to build a pilot processing plant to refine the ore. In 2018, the government created TENMAK (Turkey Energy, Nuclear and Mining Research Agency) which included a new unit called NATEN – National Rare Earth Elements Research Institute[45]. These institutional steps aimed to build domestic know-how in REE extraction and processing, acknowledging that turning ore into usable rare earth products is technically challenging. Collaboration with international partners also ramped up: for example, Turkey joined EU research projects on REEs (such as the 2020–2023 ERA-MIN **“RETECH” project focused on REE recovery from Turkish ores)[46].
• 2020: Pilot plant construction. By late 2020, Eti Maden had established a pilot processing facility at Beylikova[47]. This pilot plant was designed to experiment with extracting and separating at least a subset of rare earth oxides from the complex ore, as well as to produce the associated barite and fluorite. (Notably, construction coincided with the global COVID-19 pandemic, but work progressed as REEs were considered strategically important.)
• July 2022: Public announcement of the Beylikova REE discovery. In mid-2022, Turkey went public with the results of a decade of work. Then-Energy Minister Fatih Dönmez officially announced that 694 million tons of rare earth resource had been identified at Beylikova (Eskişehir), calling it a “historic discovery” and noting it contains 17 rare elements[48]. He emphasized the deposit’s size (comparing it to China’s) and its shallow depth (making mining easier)[11]. This announcement drew international attention, as it suddenly placed Turkey on the map of major REE holders. Around the same time, Eti Maden confirmed that the pilot plant would start processing 1,200 t/year of ore, with plans to scale up to 570,000 t/year and produce ~10,000 t of REO annually[49]. The government also highlighted that 10 REEs would initially be prioritized for production[50]. The news was met with both optimism and some skepticism abroad – experts pointed out that further verification and feasibility studies were needed to confirm how much of that 694 Mt is economically recoverable[51][52].
• Late 2022: Initial pilot production and planning. Following the announcement, work accelerated to get the pilot processing facility operational. By the end of 2022, trial runs were likely underway. Turkey also started courting international partners to help develop the resource. High-level talks were reported with countries interested in non-Chinese REE sources.
• 2023: Pilot plant operation and strategic initiatives. In April 2023, President Erdoğan inaugurated the Beylikova pilot plant and it began regular operations processing ore[49]. Minister Alparslan Bayraktar (who succeeded Dönmez) stated in late 2023 that Turkey aims to be one of the top 5 countries producing rare earths, leveraging this reserve for electric vehicle and renewable energy technologies[53]. Throughout 2023, Turkey undertook various R&D efforts: e.g. a Turkish PhD researcher successfully extracted four elements (cerium, lanthanum, scandium, niobium) in pure form from local ores in a lab setting, proving that refining is technically feasible domestically[54][55]. Also in 2023, Turkey’s Ministry of Energy published a “Critical and Strategic Minerals” report highlighting rare earths as crucial, though experts criticized it for lack of detail and external input[56]. On the international front, cooperation with China was pursued: in October 2024 (planning began in 2023), an MoU was drafted with China’s Ministry of Natural Resources to collaborate on REE mining and processing technology[57]. Meanwhile, Western countries (US and EU) kept a close eye on Turkey’s progress as they seek to diversify REE supply chains.
• 2024: Scaling up and partnerships. In 2024, construction plans for the industrial-scale REE separation plant at Beylikova were finalized, aiming to lay the foundation by 2025[58]. In October 2024, Turkey indeed signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China to advance cooperation in mining critical minerals, including rare earths[57]. This raised speculation that Turkey might seek Chinese technical assistance (given China’s expertise in REE processing) while also carefully managing competition. By late 2024, the pilot plant’s results were being used to design the larger facility. Turkey also engaged with the EU and US on critical minerals dialogue – for instance, Turkey participated in forums like the Minerals Security Partnership as an interested country (though not a core member), emphasizing its potential to supply REEs to allies.
• 2025: Recent developments and policy debates. As of 2025, Turkey is on the cusp of major REE development. Construction of a full-scale plant in Beylikova is slated to begin in 2024/2025, with a goal of commissioning it by 2026–2027[58][59]. Politically, REEs became a topic of debate: in October 2025, opposition leaders in Turkey alleged that the government had made secret deals to grant the United States rights over the Beylikova reserves, sparking controversy[60]. The government denied these claims, clarifying that a recent agreement with the US was about nuclear energy, not rare earth mining[61]. This episode underscored the geopolitical sensitivity of the resource. On the global stage, 2025 also saw the United States intensifying efforts to curb China’s dominance in REEs (including considering tariffs on Chinese rare earth products)[62], which adds strategic pressure – and opportunity – for Turkey’s project. Turkey has continued exploration in other provinces as well: Energy Minister Bayraktar confirmed ongoing rare earth exploration in Isparta, Malatya, and Sivas to potentially expand the reserve base[63]. By late 2025, Turkey’s REE initiative is transitioning from exploration to implementation, with the world watching how quickly and effectively Turkey can ramp up rare earth production.

(In summary, Turkey’s rare earth journey started slowly in the mid-20th century, remained dormant for decades, and then rapidly accelerated in the 2010s–2020s with a major discovery and concrete plans for mining and processing. Historically, Turkey has not been a producer or significant consumer of REEs until now; its current push reflects strategic foresight to become both a consumer and an exporter of these critical materials.)

Economic and Industrial Implications of Turkey’s REE Reserves

The development of rare earth reserves in Turkey carries significant economic and industrial implications, given the myriad applications of these elements in modern technology and the potential value of the deposits. A critical point is that rare earths are strategic enablers of advanced industries rather than bulk commodities – they are used in small quantities, but are essential for certain high-performance characteristics. For Turkey, which has growing defense, electronics, automotive, and energy industries, a domestic supply of REEs could bolster self-sufficiency and foster new value-added manufacturing.

Key industrial uses: Rare earth elements are indispensable in a wide range of products and technologies that Turkey either produces or aspires to produce. For example, neodymium (Nd) and praseodymium (Pr) are used to create powerful NdFeB permanent magnets that go into electric vehicle motors and wind turbine generators – sectors where Turkey plans major growth[64][26]. Dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) (heavy REEs) are critical for making these magnets retain strength at high temperatures (important for EV motors and aerospace applications). Europium (Eu) and yttrium (Y) are used in phosphors for LED lighting and displays, erbium (Er) in fiber-optic communications, samarium-cobalt magnets in specialized military technologies, and so on. In the defense sector, which is a cornerstone of Turkey’s industrial strategy, REEs are ubiquitous: they are found in jet engines, missile guidance and control systems, precision-guided munitions, radar and sonar systems, night-vision goggles, lasers, and advanced avionics[65][64]. For instance, an F-35 fighter jet contains about 410 kg of REEs in its sensors, electronics and alloy components[66], and other military platforms (warships, submarines) use even more. Ensuring a local or allied source of these materials can therefore directly support Turkey’s defense procurement and production. Additionally, REEs like cerium (Ce) and lanthanum (La) have important uses in catalysts (for oil refining and automotive catalytic converters), glass polishing, and advanced ceramics – areas linked to Turkey’s automotive and materials industries[67][68].

The presence of thorium as a co-product in the Eskişehir deposit also has implications. Thorium can be used as a nuclear fuel in next-generation reactor designs. Turkey’s Energy Ministry highlighted that 250 tons of thorium per year could be produced from Beylikova in the future[69], potentially fueling research into thorium reactors or becoming an export commodity for countries pursuing that technology. At a minimum, Turkey will need to manage thorium safely; but if leveraged, it could give Turkey a foothold in the nuclear materials market.

Economically, the raw magnitude of Turkey’s REE reserves suggests a significant market opportunity. Rare earth oxides vary in price, but many are expensive (especially certain heavy REOs). If Turkey can produce 10,000 tons of REOs annually as planned[49], and assuming a mixed basket price that could be on the order of tens of thousands of dollars per ton (depending on the mix of elements), the annual gross value of REE production could easily reach hundreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, by integrating downstream, Turkey aims to capture more value domestically. Rather than just exporting concentrates or basic oxides, officials talk about manufacturing “intermediate and end products” in Turkey – for instance, magnet alloys, electric motor components, or specialty ceramics[70][71]. This aligns with the Turkish economic model emphasizing investment, production, and export of higher value goods[72]. In essence, Turkey is looking at REEs not just as a mining venture but as the foundation for a high-tech industrial ecosystem (much like it has done with boron by developing boron-based products).

One cautionary lesson often cited domestically is Turkey’s experience with boron. Turkey controls around 63–73% of the world’s boron reserves[73][74], yet for decades it mainly exported borates as a raw material and captured relatively little of the downstream value. Only in recent years has Turkey begun to invest in boron value-added products (such as boron-enhanced glass, detergents, etc.). Experts warn that Turkey should avoid a similar trap with rare earths: merely having large reserves is not enough to guarantee economic benefit[75][76]. The refining and manufacturing steps are where much of the value lies, and these require significant know-how, specialized facilities, and highly trained personnel. The Turkish government appears aware of this – the establishment of NATEN and the emphasis on training and R&D indicate an intent to build local capabilities[54][55]. There is also advocacy for keeping REE operations predominantly under public control (at least in the initial phases) to ensure strategic oversight and prevent short-term profiteering at the expense of long-term development[77][78].

In terms of domestic usage trends, until now Turkey’s consumption of REEs was entirely met by imports. As production comes online, one immediate impact will be import substitution. Turkish industries (defense contractors, electronics producers, automakers) could source certain REE materials locally, potentially at lower cost or with greater security of supply. Eventually, if production exceeds domestic demand, Turkey expects to export surplus REEs. Minister Dönmez stated that with the Beylikova resource, Turkey will have “the opportunity to export more than we need”[79]. This could make Turkey a net exporter of certain REOs for the first time, generating export revenues and possibly allowing Turkish firms to enter global supply chains for high-tech manufacturing.

However, realizing these economic benefits will require overcoming challenges. Building a full rare earth separation plant is a heavy investment (hundreds of millions of dollars) and typically takes years to finetune. Operating costs can be high, and environmental regulations (properly handling waste, especially radioactive thorium/uranium residues) add complexity. Turkey will need to implement strict environmental and safety standards to avoid the pitfalls that caused rare earth processing in other countries to be shut down in the past. On the positive side, the co-production of barite and fluorite at Beylikova provides additional revenue streams – both are industrial minerals with steady demand (barite for oil/gas drilling mud, fluorite for chemicals and metallurgy). These could improve the overall project economics, effectively subsidizing the REE extraction costs[24].

In summary, Turkey’s rare earth reserves have the potential to fuel key industries at home (from defense to green energy) and to create a new export sector, but success will depend on Turkey’s ability to climb the learning curve of REE processing and to invest in downstream industries. If managed well, this could catalyze a high-tech manufacturing boost for the Turkish economy, aligning with broader goals of technological self-reliance and export growth.

Geopolitical Considerations and Policy Strategies

Rare earth elements are often dubbed the “oil of the 21st century” in terms of strategic importance, and Turkey’s entry into this arena carries geopolitical weight. Up until now, China has dominated REE global supply and processing (producing around 60–70% of mined rare earths and an overwhelming ~90% of processed REE oxides and alloys)[80][81]. Western nations have been seeking to diversify sources to avoid dependence on China for materials critical to defense and advanced technology. In this context, Turkey’s large reserves are drawing international interest and shaping Turkey’s foreign and industrial policy in several ways:

• Strategic leverage and alliances: Turkey’s rare earth discovery has positioned it as a potentially crucial player in allied supply chains. The United States and European Union have taken note – in fact, by 2025 U.S. sources were positioning Turkey strategically within the REE supply chain as an alternative route[82][83]. Turkey is a NATO member, and its rare earth capacity could be valuable for Western defense industries if coordinated properly. There have been discussions in forums like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) (a U.S.-led initiative to secure critical mineral supply chains) about involving countries like Turkey[84][85]. In late 2023 and 2024, high-level talks took place between Turkey and Western officials about critical minerals collaboration. For example, reports emerged that Turkish and U.S. delegations explored a partnership to develop Beylikova, though no formal deal was announced[86]. European agencies have also cooperated with Turkey on REE research (as seen with the RETECH project) and potentially could assist with regulatory and technological aspects of extraction[46]. From Turkey’s perspective, being a supplier of rare earths could improve its geopolitical standing and bargaining power, possibly yielding trade or security benefits. However, Turkey has so far trodden carefully, keeping its options open and insisting that no secret concessions have been given to any foreign power regarding REE rights[60][61].
• Balancing relations with China: While Turkey is aligned with the West in many ways, it also maintains economic relations with China. On rare earths, this creates a strategic balancing act. China is not only the world’s top producer but also has the expertise in processing that Turkey currently lacks. In May 2024, Turkey’s energy minister met with China’s Minister of Natural Resources, and “potential cooperation” on rare earths was a key agenda item[87][88]. By late 2024, Turkey signed a cooperation MoU with China covering mining and natural resources[57]. This could signal that Turkey is interested in Chinese technical assistance or investment to develop its REE value chain. For China, investing in Turkey’s REEs could ensure they have influence or access to this new source, while for Turkey it could accelerate technology transfer. However, Turkey must weigh this against the risk of over-reliance on China, which could undermine the whole point of offering an alternative supply to the West. It appears Turkey’s strategy is to welcome multiple partnerships – leveraging Chinese know-how without ceding control, and simultaneously assuring Western allies that Turkey can be a reliable, independent supplier.
• Policy of resource nationalism vs. open investment: Turkey’s approach to exploiting REEs has a strong vein of resource nationalism. Officials and experts emphasize that these strategic elements should remain under public oversight and Turkish ownership throughout the value chain[77][89]. The Beylikova site is under tight state security, akin to a sensitive nuclear site[90]. This suggests that Turkey is unlikely to simply allow a foreign company to own and operate the mine outright. Instead, any foreign involvement will probably be in the form of joint ventures, technology licensing, or minority stakes, with the Turkish state (through Eti Maden or another entity) retaining control. Indeed, Eti Maden – which is wholly state-owned – is leading the project, and there have been internal debates about how much to involve private firms. The government’s 2023 Critical Minerals report also highlighted rare earths as strategic, implying restrictive policies on export of raw ore and an emphasis on domestic processing[91][92]. In short, Turkey’s policy is geared toward building a full domestic REE industry, not just mining and selling raw materials. Legal frameworks may be adjusted to reflect this (for example, export controls on unprocessed REEs, incentives for local REE-based manufacturing, etc.).
• Self-sufficiency and defense strategy: A major driver for Turkey is reducing import dependence for critical materials. Turkey’s defense industry in particular has a goal of increasing indigenous content. Access to domestic rare earths ties into this, as it could secure the supply for components like missile parts, sensors, and engines. As noted, there is growing synergy between Turkey’s “local and national” defense initiative and its mining policy – the discovery of REEs is framed as enabling Turkey to develop its own high-tech systems without fear of foreign embargoes on materials[9][93]. In the energy realm, having REEs dovetails with Turkey’s push into renewables (wind, solar) and electric vehicles, sectors prioritized in economic plans. Thus, rare earth policy is being integrated into Turkey’s broader industrial strategy for the 2020s, aiming for strategic self-reliance. This is not to say Turkey will shun exports – rather, it wants to export value-added REE products once domestic needs are met[79], thereby strengthening both its economic security and its position as a supplier to allies.
• Regional and global influence: If Turkey successfully becomes a significant producer of rare earths, it could influence regional politics and economics. For example, Turkey could supply REEs to Europe’s burgeoning electric vehicle industry, making itself a key link in Europe’s supply chain. It could also potentially supply friendly nations in the Middle East or Asia looking to diversify their sources. On the flip side, entering the rare earth market means Turkey will be mindful of global market dynamics and potential pressures. China has in the past used its dominance as leverage (e.g., restricting exports during diplomatic disputes). As Turkey becomes a player, it could face pressure from China if perceived as undercutting Chinese market share or aligning too closely with Western supply initiatives. Being somewhat new in this field, Turkey will have to navigate such issues shrewdly, potentially via multilateral cooperation to avoid being isolated.
• Environmental and social governance: Geopolitics also intersects with how responsibly Turkey develops these reserves. The EU, for instance, will prefer supply partners who follow high environmental standards (to align with European values and regulations). Turkey has the opportunity to present itself as a reliable and sustainably managed source of REEs – avoiding the severe pollution that plagued Chinese rare earth mines in the past. This means implementing policies for safe disposal of processing waste, radiation protection (due to thorium), and community engagement around the mining site. Doing so would bolster Turkey’s image and acceptability as an REE exporter in global markets concerned with ethical sourcing.

In terms of concrete policy steps, Turkey has already enacted or proposed several measures:

• The creation of NATEN (Rare Earth Elements Research Institute) under the President’s auspices to coordinate R&D and lay out a road map[94].
• Integration of REE strategy into national documents (the Ministry’s 2023 report, and likely the upcoming five-year development plans).
• Active diplomacy to form partnerships: e.g., talks with the U.S., EU, and China as mentioned, and possibly reaching out to countries like Australia or Japan which have REE expertise (there have been unconfirmed reports that Japan’s JOGMEC and others showed interest in Turkey’s project).
• Investment incentives: Turkey is expected to classify the rare earth industrial plant as a “strategic investment”, qualifying it for incentives like tax breaks, low-interest loans, and infrastructure support.
• Education and training: Scholarships and programs to train Turkish engineers and chemists in hydrometallurgy and separation chemistry, potentially in collaboration with universities abroad, ensuring the human capital for this new industry.

Finally, an interesting geopolitical angle is Turkey’s juxtaposition with other emerging REE sources. Countries like Ukraine and Greenland also hold significant rare earth reserves and are being eyed by the West[95][96]. However, political instability (in Ukraine’s case) and regulatory hurdles (in Greenland’s case) complicate those projects. Turkey, by contrast, offers a relatively stable environment and existing industrial base. If it can expedite production by the late 2020s, Turkey could effectively become the main non-Chinese, non-Western rare earth supplier bridging East and West. This could increase Turkey’s geopolitical clout, but also will require it to maintain a balanced foreign policy – nurturing cooperation with big powers while guarding its own interests. Minister Bayraktar’s public statements in 2025 underscore this balance: he reassured that Turkey isn’t selling its REEs to any one country[61], and at the same time highlighted that Turkey’s initiative aligns with global needs to “curb China’s dominance” in a sustainable way[62].

In conclusion, Turkey’s rare earth reserves are not just a mining asset but a strategic lever that the country is now beginning to wield. The government’s policy is centered on self-sufficiency, value addition, and controlled partnerships to ensure that REE development serves national interests. Geopolitically, Turkey is positioning itself as a new indispensable node in critical mineral supply chains, which could enhance its strategic importance to allies and give it a say in the future of technologies that will define the 21st century. The next few years will be crucial as Turkey translates its resource potential into actual production and navigates the complex geopolitical landscape surrounding rare earth elements.

Sources:

• Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (Türkiye) and Anadolu Agency releases[1][11][69]
• Independent news analysis by Bianet[97][48][53][98] and Daily Sabah[99][63]
• Academic and geological studies (MTA Bulletin, 2019) on Turkish REE deposits[12][100][14]
• Rare Earth industry reports and expert commentary (Wired, 2022)[52][101][28]
• Comments by Turkish officials and experts in media[50][24][54][75], and international context from MP-IDSA commentary[41][72].

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