Serdar Öktem, a lawyer and defendant in the Sinan Ateş murder trial, was assassinated in Istanbul on October 5, 2025, outside his office on Büyükdere Avenue in the Şişli district. Assailants in two vehicles, reportedly masked, opened fire with long-barreled weapons (including a Kalashnikov) at Öktem as he waited in traffic near the 15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü junction. On its social media accounts, a gang claimed the assassination. Mr. Öktem was involved in gang-related cases, and he was heavily involved with MHP: He was one of the main suspects in the Sinan Ateş assassination…. A gang called “Daltons” claimed the assassination. Here is a report on the funnily named new gangs.

The Rise of Turkey’s New-Generation Gangs (2020–2025)

Introduction: A New Breed of Organized Crime

In the last five years, Turkey has witnessed the emergence of a “new generation mafia”, a wave of youthful gangs that differ starkly from the country’s old-school underworld. These groups – with names often drawn from 1990s cartoons like Daltonlar (the Daltons), Casperlar (Caspers), and Redkitler (Red Kit, the Turkish name for Lucky Luke) – have repeatedly made headlines with violent crimes[1][2]. Officials and experts note that these new syndicates break the mold of traditional Turkish mafia in several ways: they openly embrace social media and technology, have lower average ages (often teens and 20-somethings), and reject the strict hierarchy and “omertà” silence code of old gangs[3][4].

Unlike the old “Baba” mafia bosses who cultivated ties with politicians and police and avoided targeting state officials, the new gangs are digitally savvy, brazen, and transient in loyalty[4][5]. Their ranks consist largely of Gen Y and Gen Z members, sometimes even minors, who organize “semt semt; sokak sokak” – neighborhood by neighborhood, street by street[6]. Many began as local neighborhood crews but rapidly expanded into citywide and even international networks. Authorities label them “yeni nesil suç örgütleri”, or new-generation crime groups, due to their modern methods[6]. They are involved in a wide array of illicit enterprises – from cyber-fraud and drug trafficking to extortion, armed assaults, and illegal betting – while using digital tools to maximize reach and profits[7][8].

This report examines the rise and structure of some of the most notorious new-generation gangs in Turkey since 2020, including the network of fugitive boss Barış Boyun, the Daltonlar gang, the Casperlar gang, and other emerging groups. It will explore each gang’s background and emergence, their culture and communication tactics, recruitment of youth, criminal activities, transnational links, any political or ideological influences, as well as the law enforcement response and public reaction.

Notable New-Generation Gangs and Their Origins

Barış Boyun’s Network

One of the most prominent figures in the new wave is Barış Boyun, born 1984 in Malatya. Boyun’s syndicate started as a small neighborhood crew in Istanbul’s Beyoğlu district but grew into a major regional crime network by the late 2010s[9]. Until around 2017, Boyun was known only locally, but he expanded aggressively by performing contract killings and forming alliances, eventually reaching into the Balkans and Western Europe[10][9]. His organization, often just called the Barış Boyun gang, became notorious for motorcycle assassinations – drive-by hits inspired by Colombian cartel tactics – and bloody turf wars with rivals[11].

Boyun’s rise was facilitated in part by a climate of corruption and laissez-faire toward organized crime. Investigative reports suggest that as Turkey became a key transit for cocaine to Europe, certain mafia leaders operated with “strategic blindness” from authorities[12]. Under this permissive environment, Boyun built a brutal empire spanning drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal gambling and contract killings[13]. By 2024 he was one of Turkey’s most wanted fugitives. His gang gained infamy for transnational violence: for instance, they are accused of assassinating Serbian mafia boss Jovan Vukotić in the heart of Istanbul in 2018, acting as hired killers for Balkan crime factions[14][15]. Boyun even allegedly plotted a bomb attack against a rival Turkish mafia family (the Saral clan) during an internecine gang feud[16].

In May 2024, Barış Boyun was finally arrested in Italy in a joint Turkish-Italian operation involving hundreds of officers[17][18]. Nineteen suspects were rounded up across Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Turkey in that operation, which Italian authorities said dismantled an armed Turkish criminal network poised to carry out terrorist-like attacks[17]. Boyun’s capture was so high-profile that Turkey’s President Erdoğan personally asked Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni for his extradition[19]. Italian courts, however, refused to extradite Boyun, citing deep concerns about Turkey’s justice system and human rights record[20]. As a result, Boyun remains jailed in Italy as of 2025, despite Turkey’s efforts to bring him back[21].

Turkish and Italian officers escort a suspect (center, hooded) believed to be Barış Boyun during a joint raid in Italy on May 22, 2024[18][22]. The operation targeted Boyun’s new-generation mafia network across multiple countries.

Boyun’s network epitomizes the new-generation gang model. It leveraged international links – Italian prosecutors found his cells in Europe had ties to other foreign gangs, sharing weapons and manpower across borders[22]. His group ran a multinational criminal enterprise, with a drug lab in Bulgaria producing MDMA (ecstasy) and an arms depot in Switzerland holding military-grade weapons[23]. They smuggled cocaine from South America into Turkey (e.g. via Istanbul’s Ambarlı Port) using corrupt customs officials[24], and laundered profits through front businesses. Italian wiretaps also exposed Boyun’s connections to corrupt insiders in Turkey who helped him evade arrest and carry on his crimes with impunity[25]. This protection fed Boyun’s own narrative: in custody, he reportedly told Italian investigators that “the state is wiping out all Kurdish mafia leaders while protecting Turkish mafia leaders”, alleging that figures like Alaattin Çakıcı, the Saral family, and Sedat Peker (all from Turkey’s Black Sea region) were shielded by authorities[26]. Whether or not his claims have merit, they highlight the murky intersection of crime and politics that some new-generation gangsters perceive.

Daltonlar Gang (“The Daltons”)

Daltonlar – named after a band of bungling outlaws in a Western cartoon – have become one of Turkey’s most notorious crime syndicates since 2020. The gang was led by Can Dalton, real name Beratcan Gökdemir, a 1997-born mobster from Batman province[27]. Originally, Daltonlar operated under Barış Boyun as a sub-group or ally, but they split off in early 2024 amid a power shuffle[28]. In March 2024, Gökdemir (alias “Can Dalton”) assumed independent control of the gang[29]. Prosecutors describe Daltonlar as a heavily armed network with clear hierarchy, assigning its young members distinct roles – “motorcu” (motorcycle driver), “atıcı” (shooter), “joker” (backup attacker) – when carrying out hits[30]. This hierarchical, paramilitary structure enabled them to execute coordinated assassinations, often using pairs of gunmen on motorbikes.

Daltonlar’s emergence was punctuated by violent rivalries and alliances. For a time, Daltonlar allied with Boyun’s crew, joining forces in gang wars around Istanbul[31]. Together they fought other up-and-coming outfits like the Halil Ay and Ferhat Yeşilkaya gangs, using tactics such as drive-by shootings. Daltonlar became infamous for a string of motorcycle contract killings, including attempts on rival gang figures Halil Ay and members of the Redkitler gang[27]. In one high-profile incident, they were implicated in a shooting attack on a beauty salon owned by a social media celebrity – allegedly a scare tactic ordered by a business rival[32].

By 2024–25, Daltonlar had turned into a transnational threat. The gang’s young boss Gökdemir was arrested in Georgia in late 2024, and his lieutenant Ahmet Mustafa Timo (aka “Timocan”) was captured in Iraq in 2025[33]. These overseas arrests triggered retaliation: in March 2025, after Turkish intelligence brought Timo back from Iraq, Dalton gunmen opened fire on the Iraqi Consulate in Istanbul’s Şişli district – an unprecedented attack on a foreign mission, which officials said was revenge for Timo’s arrest[34]. Daltonlar have also spilled blood abroad. In September 2023, six young Turkish men linked to Boyun and Daltonlar were executed gangland-style in Athens, Greece, in what appeared to be a settling of scores on foreign soil[35][36]. More recently, in May 2025, Daltonlar operatives allegedly ambushed Greek intelligence officers in Thessaloniki during a surveillance operation (Greek police detained six Turkish suspects in that case)[37]. And in mid-2025, a senior Daltonlar figure was gunned down in Spain, suggesting the gang’s feud with rivals or internal rifts had reached Western Europe[38].

Despite these blows, Daltonlar remain active within Turkey. They continue to orchestrate extortion and intimidation rackets. In one incident in Bursa (Oct 2024), gunmen shot a businessman in a café, warning him “Can Dalton sends his greetings” while demanding he repay another man’s debt[39]. The very choice of name “Daltonlar” – invoking clumsy comic villains – has itself become part of the gang’s intimidation theatrics, even inspiring police code-names. Notably, Turkish police have codenamed several anti-gang operations “Red Kit” (Lucky Luke) in a nod to the Daltons theme[40].

Daltonlar’s leadership has been decimated by law enforcement in the past year. In September 2024, an alleged Daltonlar commander, Sinan “Dalton Sabo” Memi, was arrested in Poland and extradited to Turkey, while another key member, Atakan Avcı, was caught in Bulgaria[41]. In March 2025, Timo was nabbed in Iraq and handed over to Turkey[42]. By August 2025, Turkish prosecutors issued a sweeping 1,676-page indictment against 105 suspects tied to Daltonlar – 69 in custody and 9 still fugitive – seeking multiple life terms and thousands of years of prison time for the gang’s leaders[43]. Gökdemir himself remains jailed abroad (reports indicate Georgia), and other lieutenants are behind bars, awaiting trial[33].

Turkish police officers escort an alleged member of the Daltonlar gang following a nationwide operation on March 22, 2025[44]. Authorities have prioritized dismantling these new gangs, which they say seek to dominate poor urban neighborhoods through fear, extortion and armed attacks.

Casperlar Gang (“The Caspers”)

Another deadly new-generation crew is the Casperlar gang, led by Hamuş Atız of Mardin origin[45]. The Casperlar (nicknamed after Casper the ghost) operated primarily in Istanbul and Mardin province. Since 2020, they have been locked in a bitter feud with Daltonlar, turning parts of Istanbul into war zones. Clashes between Casperlar and Daltonlar have claimed numerous lives on both sides[46]. Casperlar first drew national attention in September 2024, when one of its teenage members committed a shocking crime: 19-year-old Yunus Emre Geçti, allegedly a Casperlar recruit, shot and killed 27-year-old police officer Şeyda Yılmaz during a police confrontation in Istanbul’s Ümraniye district[47][48]. The murder of a female police officer by a gang youth was a wake-up call, highlighting the emergence of children and young adults as hired guns[49][47].

In the aftermath, Casperlar did the unthinkable – they openly claimed responsibility for the cop-killer and taunted the state. The gang released a brazen social media statement glorifying Geçti as “our brother”, vowing to cover his legal fees and threatening police who allegedly mistreated him in custody[50][51]. The Casperlar statement boasted that they “stand by our brothers” and warned “we will complain about the police’s ill-treatment at the Human Rights Court”, an almost surreal turn of phrase for a criminal outfit[52][53]. They also revealed that Geçti had been involved in another violent episode: an armed attack on a state hospital in Istanbul. On Aug. 31, 2024, motorcycle gunmen fired on the Bahçelievler State Hospital emergency room, wounding police and others – an attack authorities later attributed to the ongoing Daltonlar-Casperlar turf war[54]. Casperlar’s statement admitted that Geçti provided the bikes used in that hospital hit, framing it as retaliation in their “war” with Daltonlar[54][53].

By early 2025, Casperlar’s notoriety grew even darker with the murder of 14-year-old Mattia Ahmet Minguzzi. In January 2025, young Mattia – the son of an Italian father and Turkish mother – was stabbed to death by two teenagers during a dispute at an Istanbul street market[55][56]. At least one of the 15- and 16-year-old perpetrators was reportedly tied to Casperlar, raising suspicions that the gang’s recruitment of youth was directly leading to deadly violence even against peers. After the boy’s death, the Minguzzi family received chilling death threats on social media, and on the morning of the first trial hearing in April 2025, Mattia’s grave was found desecrated – acts widely believed to be Casperlar’s attempts to intimidate the family and public[57][58]. The incident sparked national outrage and debate over youth gangs. (The family’s lawyer publicly decried the gang’s harassment and pushed for the minors to be tried as adults[57][59].)

Casperlar’s core leadership and structure remain somewhat opaque, but their tactics mirror those of their peers. They maintain a strong social media presence, using online platforms to issue threats and rally support. The gang’s willingness to attack even state targets (police, hospitals) shows a complete lack of ideological or “state-respect” constraints that old mafias observed[5][50]. Casperlar instead operate as “serseri” (rogue) guns-for-hire, deeply immersed in the drug trade and local extortion in Istanbul’s districts. Their base in Mardin (southeast Turkey) suggests some members have southeastern or Kurdish backgrounds, but the group does not espouse any overt political ideology – its loyalties are to crime and profit. Indeed, like other new-gen gangs, Casperlar are ready to form opportunistic alliances; for example, they have at times teamed up with or clashed against the Gündoğmuşlar and Anucurlar gangs in Istanbul’s Kağıthane district during multi-sided turf wars[60].

Other Emerging Gangs (Redkitler, Baygaralar, and More)

Beyond Boyun, Daltonlar, and Casperlar, several other new-generation criminal groups have proliferated across Turkey in recent years. These include gangs with colorful monikers and regional bases, often entangled in the same web of conflicts:

• Redkitler (“Lucky Lukes”) Gang: Led by Ferhat “Mardin” Delen, this group took its name from the cowboy cartoon Red Kit. Redkitler is active in Istanbul’s Yenibosna area and even infiltrated the world of football ultras – they have influence in Genç Fenerbahçe, a supporter group of the Fenerbahçe soccer club[61]. Redkitler gained a reputation for targeted hits against the Barış Boyun gang and Daltonlar. They were linked to the September 2023 Athens massacre where 6 of Boyun’s and Daltonlar’s men were killed, suggesting Redkitler gunmen struck down their rivals abroad[62]. With many members from Mardin, Redkitler at times feuded with Casperlar and allied with others, showing the fluid alliances of these gangs.
• Baygaralar Gang: Founded by Ramazan Baygara (born 1998) in Adana, Baygaralar grew from a local clan into a network of over 270 members operating in Adana, Şanlıurfa, Kırklareli, Batman, Istanbul, İzmir, Ankara and beyond[63]. They are known for violent feuds in Adana, notably against the Çoğaçlar and Şirinler gangs. In fact, Ramazan Baygara’s own brother was murdered by a rival clan[64]. Baygaralar didn’t hesitate to make high-profile hits: in 2022, they assassinated an ex-con named Cenk Çelik after he insulted exiled mafia boss Sedat Peker on social media[65]. This suggests Baygaralar sought to curry favor or notoriety by avenging Peker, a figure revered in some underworld circles. The Baygaralar have cooperated with other new-gen mobs; for a period, they allied with Barış Boyun and Daltonlar[65]. Ramazan Baygara became subject to an Interpol Red Notice and was arrested in Greece in 2024 – Greek authorities agreed to extradite him, but then curiously released him under house arrest in 2025, allowing him to vanish back into the underworld[66].
• Gündoğmuşlar vs. Anucurlar: These two were rival neighborhood gangs in Istanbul’s Kağıthane district whose 2020 clash snowballed into a multi-gang war. Led by Uğurcan Gündoğmuş (b. 1995) and İnan Anucur (b. 1988) respectively, they started a firefight over territory in 2020[60]. The violence soon drew in bigger players: Barış Boyun’s hitmen, Daltonlar shooters, Redkitler, as well as crews led by Halil Ay, Ferhat Yeşilkaya, and Emrah Ayverdi all jumped into the fray[60]. This escalated feud became a tangled network of alliances and betrayals, emblematic of new-generation gang dynamics. Over 20 people, including the original leaders Anucur, Halil Ay, and Ferhat Yeşilkaya, were killed in the ongoing tit-for-tat murders[60]. Such gangland battles turning Istanbul streets into free-fire zones have unnerved the public and kept police scrambling.
• Camgözler Gang: Led by Binali Camgöz from İzmir, this syndicate straddles the line between old and new generation. Camgöz, who fled Turkey in 2018, was known for extortion rackets and even murder, and he built a network that extended into Europe. He was captured in Montenegro in 2023 and extradited back to Turkey after a diplomatic effort[67]. Turkish officials count Camgöz’s group among the “new” mobs, and his takedown was part of a nationwide sweep against organized crime. (In a single year, Turkey’s security forces claim to have busted hundreds of gangs – 420 gangs in 2022 alone, 11 of them international in scope[68] – underscoring the scale of the problem.)

Each of these groups has its own origin story, but they share common traits. They tend to arise in economically depressed neighborhoods, often provincial migrants or marginalized youth banding together. Many got their start by doing dirty work as “taşeron” (contract hitmen or subcontractors) for established mafia bosses, thereby gaining experience and a reputation[69]. For example, early on Daltonlar and others worked as enforcers for bigger crime families – until they amassed enough firepower to challenge their former patrons. Once they expand, these gangs sometimes forge alliances with one another for mutual benefit (as Boyun did with Şahin’s group against the Sarals[15], or Baygaralar partnering with Daltonlar). But such pacts are often short-lived; today’s ally can be tomorrow’s enemy in the volatile underworld.

Gang Culture, Symbols, and Communication

One of the most striking differences of the new-generation gangs is their culture and self-branding. They operate not in shadows but in the glare of social media. These groups actively cultivate an image through online channels – Instagram, YouTube, and especially TikTok – turning crime into a viral spectacle. According to an Istanbul indictment, gangs like Daltonlar post videos regularly to recruit and galvanize young followers[70][71]. In fact, prosecutors noted that one gang even had a dedicated “social media manager” on payroll to run its propaganda online[71].

Social media posts by these gangs are carefully curated to project power, wealth, and status. Often, leaders (many of whom hide abroad to avoid arrest) will flaunt luxury cars, stacks of cash, upscale nightclubs, and arsenals of weapons in their videos[72]. For instance, Daltonlar’s bosses posted clips from exotic resorts and sports cars, styling themselves as untouchable playboys to entice youth[72]. This digital braggadocio serves to romanticize gangster life. As Assoc. Prof. Gül Esra Atalay observes, the content “highlights symbols of power, riches and prestige, while normalizing or even romanticizing criminal activity”[73][74]. Teenagers, especially those from vulnerable or low-income backgrounds, often idolize these figures and see gang membership as a path to respect and fast money[75].

The gangsters also use social platforms for intimidation and communication. It’s common for rival groups to trade vicious insults and threats in public posts or live-streams. Unlike old mafia dons who adhered to a code of silence, the new thugs will curse each other’s families on TikTok and broadcast their feuds for clout[76]. This very public form of “gang beef” was unheard of in prior generations. The Casperlar’s threatening manifesto on social media after the policewoman’s killing – replete with anti-police rhetoric and promises of revenge – is a prime example[50][53]. They even announced, in effect, “We have endless brothers among Casper members,” signaling unity and daring authorities to come at them[48].

Beyond online bravado, these gangs have adopted names, symbols and slang that set them apart. The penchant for cartoon-inspired nicknames (Daltons, Caspers, Red Kits, etc.) is itself a cultural statement – a mix of dark humor and nostalgia. Many of the members grew up in the 1990s and 2000s on a diet of video games and internet TV series, which influences their criminal style[77]. Officials note that the gangs’ jargon and “racon” (code of honor) are often lifted from popular Turkish mafia dramas and online series[78]. In other words, life is imitating art: young criminals emulate the glamorous vigilante kingpins they see in hit shows, blurring fiction and reality. “These shows depict crime bosses as justice-dispensing, fearless heroes – with wealth to boot. Youth facing bleak prospects can easily view that lifestyle as a way out,” explains Dr. Atalay[79].

Another hallmark of gang culture is their use of music for propaganda. Several Turkish rap songs and music videos in recent years have been commissioned to glorify gang leaders. Notably, Barış Boyun’s crew allegedly hired underground rappers to produce tracks praising Boyun and spinning his violent deeds as heroic[80]. One rap song titled “İntikam” (Revenge) even featured Boyun’s photograph and ended with the lyric: “Barış isteyen boyun eğecek, boyun eğmeyen hesap verecek” – a play on Boyun’s name meaning “Those who want peace will bow, those who don’t will pay”[81]. Other anthems mentioned in indictments include popular YouTube rap hits like “Aynen” (108 million views) and “Hokkabazlar” (115 million views), which, while not explicitly naming gangs, were interpreted as rallying cries that resonated with the gang culture[82]. Through music, these groups attempt to normalize their activities and appeal to 15-20 year-olds, extending their reach beyond their immediate circles[80].

On the streets, new-gen gang members also signal their presence through graffiti tags, banners, and fan group infiltration. Daltonlar, for example, have exploited football stadiums to drop banners with their gang’s name or slogans[83]. By blending into the fanatical atmosphere of soccer ultras, they both recruit and launder their image as just “rowdy fans.” Some gangs mark turf with graffiti of their crew names or initials, a practice reminiscent of urban street gangs globally. They lack the subtle, suit-and-tie front of old Istanbul mafiosi – instead, they embrace a street aesthetic: hoodies, motorbikes, and ostentatious bling featured in their TikTok clips. All of this is geared toward building a brand that disaffected youth find aspirational.

Recruitment: Luring the Z Generation

The new-generation gangs feed on a steady pipeline of teenage recruits. Their recruitment strategies target boys as young as 15, often from poor, migrant, or broken families. Social media is the primary hunting ground: gang operatives scan platforms for admirers and aggressively court them. They make joining a gang seem “cool” – highlighting fast cash, designer clothes, motorcycles, and a sense of belonging. Investigations show Daltonlar successfully recruited even 15-year-olds via TikTok and Instagram, seducing them with images of a luxury lifestyle and promises of becoming rich and feared[84]. Leaders like Gökdemir, posting from abroad with flashy cars and nightclubs, craft an illusion that resonates with teenagers craving status[72]. Authorities liken these youth to “kamikaze drones” – once lured in, they are dispatched on violent missions without hesitation, often unaware of how expendable they are to their bosses[85].

These gangs also recruit on the ground in urban ghettos and Anatolian towns. Many foot-soldiers are young men who migrated from eastern Turkey or impoverished rural areas to the big cities and struggled to find steady jobs. A retired police chief bluntly noted that “most of them are likely drug addicts” and thus easily manipulated[76]. In some cases, gang leaders deliberately hook recruits on drugs to ensure loyalty. An indictment against Boyun’s group revealed that a gang lieutenant would round up youths who were already narcotic users, supply them with drugs, and in exchange have them carry out crimes like trafficking, assaults, and extortion[86][87]. By maintaining their addiction, the gang kept these teens dependent and controllable – a tactic chillingly described as using them “in exchange for providing drugs”[87].

The recruitment often takes the form of forming “cell houses” or safehouses where new recruits are indoctrinated. Daltonlar, for example, rented apartments (even via Airbnb) in various Istanbul districts like Esenyurt and Bahçelievler, where they would gather fresh teenage recruits[88]. At these sites, the newcomers would be outfitted with weapons, masks, and motorcycles to prepare for hit jobs[88]. Essentially, the gangs create an assembly line of young hitmen. Once enlisted, these youths usually have scant training beyond video games and what they’ve seen online – but they are given real guns and sent to do real violence.

The demographic profile reveals gangs focusing on young males roughly 15–25 years old, often those who fell through society’s cracks. Some are runaways or school dropouts; others have petty crime records before being absorbed into organized crime. Many recruits have a history of juvenile delinquency – for instance, the 19-year-old who killed officer Yılmaz had 26 prior criminal records by age 19[89]. Such individuals find a twisted refuge in gangs, which provide structure, identity, and an outlet for aggression that they fail to get from mainstream society. The “prestige of belonging to a powerful group” is a key draw for these youths, as experts point out[75]. They are in a phase of identity formation, and the gang fills that void with a ready-made persona – the feared gangster – which they embrace.

Crucially, these gangs also exploit Turkey’s fanatic subcultures, like football fan clubs and online gaming communities, as recruitment pools. Daltonlar’s appearance in stadium banners is one example[83]. Redkitler’s sway over a Fenerbahçe ultra group is another[90]. In those environments, young men already prone to tribal loyalty and violence can be cherry-picked for more serious criminal endeavors. Likewise, the obsession with mafia-themed TV series and video games creates a fertile ground where the line between play-violence and real violence blurs. Prosecutors noted that recruits “grew up on computer games and internet series”, and their notions of gangster ethos were shaped by that media[77]. This means when a real gang approaches them, it feels like leveling up in a game or living out a show – with little grasp of the consequences.

It’s worth noting that recruitment is not only about lure but also about retention. New-generation gangs have very fluid membership; defections and switching sides are common[91]. “They won’t be anyone’s man,” said one official, “Today they stand with Ahmet, tomorrow with Mehmet”[76]. Loyalty is often to money or drugs, not to any code or leader. As such, gangs continually need new blood to replace those lost to arrests, death, or desertion. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle where recruitment is aggressive and ongoing, pulling ever more youth into the spiral of violence.

Criminal Activities and Patterns

Despite their modern twists, Turkey’s new-generation gangs ultimately revolve around classic organized crime activities – albeit with some new emphases. Drug trafficking is a cornerstone of their income. They operate at multiple levels of the drug trade: from street-level dealing and guarding stash houses to international smuggling. Heroin and methamphetamine have been traditional markets (Turkey lies on the Balkan heroin route), but in recent years cocaine has become lucrative as Latin American cartels route shipments via Turkey[92][93]. Boyun’s syndicate, for example, was deeply involved in cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe, using Turkey as a transit and distribution base[94]. Turkish authorities seized several multi-ton cocaine shipments linked to Turkish gangs in 2020–2023[95][96]. With the Taliban’s opium ban causing regional heroin shortages, many Turkish gangs pivoted aggressively to the cocaine trade, increasing competition and violence among them[97].

On the domestic front, gangs like those of Boyun and Baygara also ran drug production operations – e.g. an MDMA (ecstasy) lab in Bulgaria run by Boyun[23]. Within Turkey, they recruit youths as dealers and “drug cooks.” The Istanbul Prosecutor’s indictment on Boyun’s group described how a gang supervisor would employ underage addicts to manufacture and peddle drugs, effectively franchising the drug business at the street corner level[86][87]. In exchange for their work, these young pushers were paid in drugs (feeding their addiction) and small cash, while the gang reaped the profits. Methamphetamine (crystal meth) use has surged in Turkey recently, and experts note gangs have capitalized on this trend[98].

Beyond narcotics, the new mafias have dived into illegal betting and online gambling as a major revenue stream. Illegal sports betting rings – often run via encrypted apps or offshore websites – have become a multi-billion lira industry in Turkey. The Barış Boyun indictment explicitly mentioned illegal betting among the gang’s income sources[8][99]. Cybercrime savvy members help set up betting portals and payment networks, giving the gangs a white-collar crime dimension. They launder money through cryptocurrency and online gaming credits at times.

Of course, they still engage in the age-old crimes of extortion (“haraç”) and loan-sharking. A common pattern is to threaten local businessmen, nightclubs, or construction contractors for “protection” payments. If demands aren’t met, these gangs won’t hesitate to carry out bombings, arson or shootings. In one case, Daltonlar members shot a café patron in broad daylight over an unpaid debt of someone else – a message to demonstrate their reach in debt collection[39]. Some gangs, like Camgöz’s in Izmir, specialized in loansharking and racketeering, charging usurious interest and using violence to collect[100].

Contract killings (taşeron usulü cinayet) have become almost a hallmark of the new generation mafia[14]. They operate as hired guns in both domestic rivalries and for international clients. The assassination of Jovan Vukotić, a Serbian mob boss, in Istanbul in 2018 was carried out by Boyun’s hitmen on behalf of one side in a Balkan mafia war[14]. Similarly, Boyun’s network was implicated in the murder of a Turkish man in Berlin in March 2024 (likely a gangland settling of accounts) which he coordinated via encrypted messaging apps[101][102]. The willingness of these Turkish gangs to do “wet work” across borders – essentially acting as transnational hit squads – has alarmed European authorities. It blurs the line between organized crime and mercenary terror. Italian police even characterized Boyun’s group as an organization aiming to commit “terrorist acts”, due to its plot to carry out armed attacks on civilian targets (like the foiled plan to attack the Viterbo festival in Italy)[17][103].

Another notable pattern is the frequent use of motorcycles in crimes. Experts say motorcycles have become ubiquitous for the new gangs, both for quick assassinations and for ferrying drugs and guns around congested cities[104][105]. Two men on a motorbike can slip through traffic, make a hit, and disappear far faster than a car – a tactic that has sadly played out in Istanbul, even on busy highways. (One brazen example was a motorcycle shooting on the Haliç Bridge in Istanbul in January 2023 that killed one person during rush hour[106].) Police have tried to counter this by closely monitoring motorbike thefts and riders, deploying thousands of officers in plainclothes to watch for hit squads[107]. The gangs also use motorcycles to courier narcotics and weapons across city neighborhoods with less detection risk[104][105].

In carrying out their crimes, these groups have shown technical adaptability. They install secret compartments (“zulas”) in luxury cars to hide guns or drugs while transporting them[108]. Boyun’s crew, for instance, rigged fancy vehicles with professionally built hiding spots for firearms and even traveled with women and children in the car as decoys to appear like ordinary families during arms shipments[108][109]. They prefer to communicate via encrypted messaging apps like WhatsApp, Signal or FaceTime, to evade wiretaps[110]. Some members even kept bribed police officers or night watchmen as escorts to warn them of any checkpoints or arrest warrants, essentially using corrupted law enforcement as shields[111].

The gangs’ targets and victims range widely. They fight each other in cycles of assassination and reprisal – a leader of one gang gets shot, prompting a revenge hit on the other side. They also target those who cross them: businessmen who refuse extortion, underlings who betray them, or public figures who offend them (like the man who insulted Sedat Peker and was killed by Baygaralar[112]). Even completely apolitical events have been stained by their violence: the Italian police believe Boyun’s gang was ready to shoot up a crowded Catholic procession in Viterbo in 2025 just to kill a rival clan leader in attendance[103][113]. Such recklessness – risking mass casualties at a cultural festival – underscores how far these groups will go to eliminate enemies.

Meanwhile, ordinary citizens increasingly feel the impact, whether it’s a stray bullet from a gang crossfire or the spread of drugs in their neighborhood. Public markets, cafes, hospitals, and even schools have become backdrops to gang incidents. The murder of young Mattia Minguzzi in a public market and the gunfight in an emergency room are sobering examples of civilians caught in the crossfire of gang rivalries[56][54]. Consequently, there’s a growing perception that these new mafias operate with impunity and a complete disregard for collateral damage, unlike older crime bosses who at least claimed to avoid harming innocents.

Transnational Connections and European Links

Turkey’s new-generation gangs do not confine themselves to national borders – they are deeply entwined with transnational crime networks. This is partly a product of Turkey’s large diaspora in Europe and its geographic position as a bridge to the Middle East and Balkans. Many of the gang members have spent time in Europe or have dual nationality ties. They exploit these links to establish cells abroad for refuge, networking, and operations.

For instance, Barış Boyun’s organization extended its reach through the Turkish diaspora in countries like Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece. Italian prosecutors found that Boyun’s Italian cell was “linked to other foreign ones across Europe,” all able to support each other with weapons, manpower, and logistics[114][22]. Essentially, a pan-European Turkish mafia web is emerging. Boyun’s men could source machine guns from allies in Switzerland, safe houses in Italy, and forged documents or getaway routes via Germany. His ability to set up a drug factory in Bulgaria and orchestrate hits in Berlin and Athens shows a high degree of cross-border coordination[23][101]. European law enforcement, including Europol, have noted that Turkish gangs now play key roles in Europe’s organized crime – controlling heroin distribution in some areas, engaging in human trafficking, and increasingly in cocaine networks[115][116]. Europol’s 2024 report even highlighted Turkish networks among the continent’s most dangerous criminal enterprises[117][118].

Several dramatic incidents have underscored these international ties. The Athens massacre of September 2023 (six Turks killed execution-style) was reportedly a showdown between Boyun-affiliated and Şahin-affiliated gangsters on Greek soil[119][120]. Greek media described it as a spillover of a Turkish mafia feud, possibly linked to Boyun’s vendetta with the Saral family (some of the slain men were allegedly Saral associates). In another case, in May 2025, Greek police in Thessaloniki came under fire while surveilling suspects tied to Daltonlar, indicating that even Greek intelligence operations were being met with violence by these gangs[37].

The reach extends to safe havens: when leaders flee Turkey, they often go to countries with significant Turkish communities or weaker extradition enforcement. Beratcan Gökdemir (Can Dalton) hid in Georgia until he was caught[33]. Ramazan Baygara slipped into Greece. Boyun managed to live relatively freely in Italy for some time – Italian media revealed he had even been under house arrest near Rome since 2022, pending Turkey’s extradition request[121]. It took nearly two years before a joint operation finally put him in a cell in 2024. This illustrates how differences in legal systems (and concerns over Turkey’s rule of law) can allow these gangsters to play cat-and-mouse internationally.

Moreover, Turkish gangs have formed alliances with foreign crime groups. Boyun’s alliance with Sedat Şahin’s Şahinler (who have European drug connections) against the Saral clan is one domestic example that had international implications[15]. There are also indications of collaboration with Balkan cartels. The murder of Jovan Vukotić in Istanbul by Boyun’s hitmen was done at the behest of one Montenegrin mafia faction (Škaljari vs. Kavač), demonstrating Turkish gangs acting as contract enforcers for Balkan mafias[14]. In return, those groups might provide Turkish gangs with access to drug routes or forged documents. The fluidity of these networks is reminiscent of a globalized criminal underworld where nationality is secondary to opportunity.

Some of the new generation gangsters themselves have backgrounds that straddle countries. For example, the victim Mattia Minguzzi had an Italian father – while he was just a victim, it exemplifies how transnational families and communities can be touched by these crimes[122]. Another case: some members of these gangs were caught in Poland and Bulgaria (like Daltonlar’s Sinan Memi and Atakan Avcı), suggesting they had operations or escapes there[123]. Interpol red notices have been increasingly deployed to track these fugitives across borders, and Turkey’s Interpol department worked with partners to nab several in 2024–25[124][125]. In September 2025, Turkey’s Interior Minister announced 9 fugitives on Interpol Red Notices were extradited from various European and Gulf countries, likely including some gang figures[126].

It’s also notable that some new-gen gangs are ethnically Kurdish or rooted in Turkey’s southeast, which has led them to form separate networks abroad. Boyun himself is rumored to be Kurdish (his comment about Kurdish mafia leaders being wiped out suggests he identifies as such)[26]. If true, that could align him with Kurdish-origin drug networks in Europe (which have existed since the 1980s for heroin trafficking). However, there isn’t overt ethnic solidarity – these gangs are pragmatic and will fight anyone, Kurdish or Turkish or otherwise, who stands in their way. But they might leverage diaspora connections: for example, Kurdish gangs in Europe might help hide Boyun’s men, while Black Sea-linked Turkish gangs might shelter Saral’s men, etc., reflecting Turkey’s own regional divides mirrored abroad.

Another transnational aspect is illegal immigration and human smuggling. The Italian operation that caught Boyun mentioned his group was suspected of aiding illegal immigration[127]. Turkey’s location makes it a key transit for migrants to Europe, and gangs do profiteer from smuggling migrants or providing fake passports. Turkish police in 2022 identified that some of these very gangs were involved in migrant trafficking rings, charging thousands of dollars per person to be sent to Europe. This adds a “human security” dimension to their crimes beyond drugs and violence.

In summary, these new Turkish gangs are not a purely domestic menace; they are nodes in a larger transnational crime web. They challenge law enforcement cooperation across borders, as seen with Italy and Turkey’s interplay over extradition and operations. Europol has flagged Turkish organized crime as a growing force in Europe[118], and incidents from Sweden (where Turkish gang shootings have occurred among expatriate communities) to the Middle East (some fugitives hide in North Iraq or Dubai) underline that this is a multi-country issue.

Political and Ideological Influences

Unlike the old-generation Turkish mafia that often wrapped itself in nationalist rhetoric and had tacit understandings with the “deep state,” the new gangs generally eschew overt political or ideological agendas. They are driven by profit and personal power rather than any creed. In the past, figures like Alaattin Çakıcı or Sedat Peker were known for ultra-nationalist posturing or relationships with state factions, and they wouldn’t harm state officials (earning them the label “devletçi”, pro-state)[5]. The new breed has “no interest in devletçilik” (state loyalty) – in fact, they have directly attacked police, as seen in Ümraniye and Bahçelievler, something old mafiosi would rarely do[128]. They are “completely rogue structures,” as one retired officer put it, often composed of hired guns on motorcycles with no qualms about killing law enforcement[128].

However, the political environment in Turkey has indirectly influenced their rise. Critics argue that a breakdown in rule of law and selective tolerance of crime has enabled these gangs. For instance, after 2016, massive purges in the police and judiciary removed many experienced officers and created an atmosphere of impunity for organized crime tied to power circles[129][130]. Some gang leaders thrived because certain crimes (like cocaine trafficking) were allegedly ignored if they greased the right palms[12]. Sedat Peker, before falling out with the regime, famously suggested that drug money was propping up elements of the Turkish state. Boyun’s claims to Italian authorities – that the Turkish state protects certain mafias (those from Black Sea or aligned with the regime) while crushing others (Kurdish or independent ones) – reflect a perception that political favoritism plays a role in who gets targeted[26]. Indeed, Boyun had aligned with Sedat Şahin, possibly hoping for protection via Şahin’s clout, against the Saral family which was rumored to have stronger political connections[15].

There have also been accusations that some new-generation gang members had ties to political youth groups or were used as muscle in local politics. One example: an armed attack at an Istanbul rally of an AKP mayoral candidate in Feb 2024 was linked to Boyun’s group[131]. The details are murky – possibly a feud spilling into politics or a gang being paid to intimidate a political event. What it underscores is the potential crossover between gang violence and political intimidation in a polarized Turkey. Organized crime figures have historically been employed by the state to do dirty work (e.g. against insurgents or political opponents), and some fear the Gen-Z gangs could be similarly exploited. However, so far these particular groups seem more interested in their own turf wars and illegal businesses than any grand political cause.

One ideological element is the ultra-nationalist vs. ethnic undertone. The old mafia were mostly ethnically Turkish or Laz (Black Sea region) and nationalist in image[132]. Many new gang members hail from Kurdish, Arab, or Zaza backgrounds (Southeastern Turkey). Boyun explicitly drew an ethnic divide line in his statements, naming mostly ethnic Turkish bosses as state-favored[26]. That said, Boyun cooperated with Sedat Şahin (who is an ethnic Turk from the Black Sea) because it was convenient, and he tried to murder Burhanettin Saral (also an ethnic Turk). So ethnic solidarity is thin. Still, one could argue there is an implicit ideological angle: some of these Kurdish-origin gangs might feel alienated from a state they see as nationalist, potentially fueling their brazenness to target police. The Casperlar’s rhetoric after the police killing, for instance, while not explicitly ethnic, was unprecedented in its anti-state bravado[50][53]. It’s also telling that they invoked the “Human Rights Court” – co-opting human rights language to shield their criminal acts, possibly to draw attention to police brutality. This shows a savvy understanding of discourse more than any genuine ideological commitment.

Another interaction with politics is how authorities themselves frame the issue. Opposition politicians have seized on the new mafia wave to criticize the government’s law-and-order record. In 2024, the Turkish Democrat Party (Dem Parti) submitted a motion in parliament to investigate the rise of these gangs and why they enjoy impunity[133]. They essentially alleged that government negligence (or worse, collusion) allowed a “new mafia” to form. Likewise, media outlets not aligned with the government, like Sözcü and BirGün, have run investigative pieces shining light on the gangs, putting pressure on officials to respond[134][135].

From the government side, officials publicly take a hard line. Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya has repeatedly declared all-out war on these gangs, equating them with terrorists. In early 2025 he vowed: “No matter how big they are or where they flee, we will capture and return every single organized crime member and drug trafficker. They cannot escape us.”[136]. This rhetoric positions the fight against new gangs as a continuation of Turkey’s struggle against terrorism and suggests no tolerance. The state has also brandished its successes – e.g. highlighting hundreds of gang busts nationwide[68], extraditions of kingpins like Camgöz or Boyun’s associates, and new police units formed to tackle these groups.

Interestingly, one can observe that when these gangs started encroaching on politically sensitive territory – such as an AKP rally or causing public outrage by killing a cop – the response was swift and forceful. The Italian cooperation to get Boyun came after Erdoğan’s personal intervention[19]. The crackdown on Daltonlar ramped up after their attacks hit international nerves (consulate and Greek incidents) and domestic ones (high-profile cafe shooting). This suggests the Turkish state is now fully awakened to the threat.

In summary, while these new-generation gangs are not driven by political ideologies, their rise and operations are intertwined with Turkey’s political climate and ethnic social fabric. They flourish in the grey areas of governance – benefiting from corruption, legal gaps (like lenient juvenile sentencing laws), and at times playing games with public sentiment (as Casperlar did, painting their cop-killer as a victim of police abuse). They are more anarchic than ideological, which in some ways makes them even more dangerous to a state accustomed to co-opting or managing traditional mafias.

Law Enforcement Response

Turkish law enforcement has been forced to adapt quickly to this new crime wave. Initially caught off-guard by the decentralized, youth-driven nature of the gangs, police and prosecutors have since mounted a series of large-scale operations and legal maneuvers to combat them.

One key step has been the launch of special multi-province operations targeting these syndicates. Starting around 2022, Turkish police conducted nationwide sweeps with code names like Operasyon Red Kit (targeting Daltonlar)[40] and others referencing gang monikers. These raids often involve dawn busts on dozens of addresses simultaneously. For example, in March 2024, Interior Minister Yerlikaya announced an operation against Boyun’s group that netted 13 suspects in Tekirdağ who were allegedly plotting assassinations[131], followed by 8 more arrests in İzmir in April 2024[137]. Similarly, after the Minguzzi murder in 2025, Istanbul police stepped up roundups of juvenile gang members in hotspot districts and increased patrols around schools and parks.

Turkish intelligence (MIT) has also joined the fight, especially for fugitives abroad. The captures of Ramazan Baygara in Greece, Sinan Memi in Poland, and Ahmet Timo in Iraq were coordinated efforts often involving MIT or Interpol liaison work[138]. In Baygara’s case, MIT reportedly pinpointed his location in Athens which led to his arrest by Greek authorities[66]. And when legal extradition processes stall (as with Boyun in Italy), Turkey has sought diplomatic channels or, in some cases, less formal means to get suspects back. In September 2025, Turkey touted the extradition of 9 wanted crime figures from abroad, showing a renewed emphasis on international cooperation[126].

Another major response is sweeping indictments and trials to incapacitate these gangs legally. The Daltonlar indictment in August 2025 – stretching over 1,676 pages and charging 105 suspects[43] – is emblematic of how prosecutors are trying to decapitate gang leadership through the courts. They are asking for multiple life sentences plus hundreds of years for gang leaders, effectively aiming to lock them away forever[139]. Indictments not only charge the shooters but also the gang’s financiers, arms suppliers, and social media propagandists, using Turkey’s broad organized crime statutes. For instance, charges often include forming an armed criminal organization, premeditated murder, drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism-related offenses (the Italian authorities even considered Boyun’s acts as “terrorist” conspiracy)[140].

Law enforcement has also adapted tactics on the street. Recognizing the gangs’ penchant for motorcycles, the Istanbul police created special teams to monitor bike gangs and even restricted nighttime motorcycle pillion riding in some areas (since most hits involve two riders). Thousands of officers were reassigned to watch for the telltale signs of a hit squad – stolen plate motorcycles with two young males riding erratically[107]. In high-risk neighborhoods, undercover police now mingle to gather intel on recruitment and planned hits. Istanbul’s police chief in 2024 noted that the force had to “develop new methods as the mafia’s shape changes”[141][142]. This includes heavier digital surveillance: cybercrime units now scour TikTok, YouTube, and Telegram for gang-related content to identify members and threats in advance[143][144].

After the Casperlar publicly threatened police and boasted on social media, authorities responded not only with arrests but also by addressing the custodial abuse allegations – releasing a statement on proper treatment – to avoid giving the gang any propaganda win. However, they also made a show of force: images of Casperlar suspects being apprehended in raids were circulated to signal that such anti-state bravado would be crushed.

Legislatively, there are calls to adjust laws to deal with these youthful offenders. Turkish law mandates reduced sentences for under-18 perpetrators, which means even for a heinous murder like Minguzzi’s, the teen killers might face at most 15-24 years[145][146]. This sparked debate that gangs exploit minors as hitmen knowing they’ll get leniency. In response, some politicians have proposed harsher penalties for juvenile gang crimes or removing automatic sentence reductions in extreme cases[147]. As of 2025, an MP from the DEM Party tabled a motion for a parliamentary inquiry into youth crime and cited the Minguzzi case, calling for reforms so that such killers are not treated merely as children[148].

Authorities are also focusing on the socio-economic roots of recruitment as a preventative measure. Law enforcement veterans like Haydar Özdemir argue policing alone won’t solve it: “You can’t fight this just with police measures”[149]. They advocate tackling youth unemployment and education failures that feed the gang pool[150][151]. There’s talk of improving vocational training for at-risk teens and expanding rehab programs for youth with drug issues[151][152]. Some suggest reforming the juvenile reformatory system and increasing the deterrence of punishments – ending the cycle of catch-and-release where young offenders assume they’ll get out in a few years anyway[153]. As Prof. Oğuz Polat noted, the frequent amnesties and sentence reductions in Turkey undermine deterrence: “They think ‘a pardon will come out anyway, I won’t serve much’”, pointing out that overcrowded prisons and policies like early parole contribute to lack of fear of punishment[154]. Indeed, Turkey’s prisons are so full that alternatives like supervised release are often used, inadvertently enabling some gang members to return to the streets quickly[155].

Publicly, the government has made a point to showcase successes: media is invited to cover scenes where luxury sports cars seized from gang leaders are repainted and put into official police service – a symbolic turning of the tables[156]. Press conferences tout large weapons caches seized from gang hideouts and the size of indictments. All these are meant to reassure the public that law enforcement is hitting back hard.

Still, challenges remain. The fact that Italy’s highest court refused to extradite Boyun because of mistrust in Turkey’s judicial treatment was a blow[20]. It highlighted that unless Turkey addresses its rule-of-law and prison condition concerns, some fugitives might evade justice by arguing they won’t get a fair trial back home. Additionally, the decentralized, semi-anonymous nature of these gangs (no formal memberships, members switching sides) means police must target the ecosystem, not just individuals. That means long-term infiltration and surveillance of online forums, keeping tabs on known recruiters, and community policing in neighborhoods to dissuade kids from gang seduction.

Public Perception and Reactions

The Turkish public has watched the rise of these new gangs with a mix of alarm, anger, and morbid fascination. High-profile incidents – a mob prince live-streaming threats, a teenager executing another in broad daylight, a female cop slain on duty – have dominated news cycles and social media discussions. Many Turks were stunned to learn of a “Z Kuşağı mafya” (“Gen Z mafia”) in their midst[4]. The notion that mobsters barely out of adolescence are terrorizing neighborhoods and flaunting it on TikTok has prompted a national conversation on youth, morality, and state failure.

Public outrage peaked after particularly tragic cases. The murder of Mattia Ahmet Minguzzi in January 2025 struck a deep chord, not only because the victim was a bright 14-year-old from a respected family, but also due to the cruel aftermath (grave desecration, threats) that played out in the open[57][58]. The Turkish media widely covered Mattia’s parents’ plea for justice. His mother vowed to “make the whole world hear” of her son’s story if needed[157]. This case intensified calls to reform how juvenile killers are punished and became a rallying point for those demanding a tougher stance on youth gangs.

Similarly, the killing of Officer Şeyda Yılmaz in 2024 outraged the public and rank-and-file police. When images surfaced of her suspected killer Yunus Emre Geçti being apprehended – and later of him allegedly roughed up in custody – it sparked a heated debate on vigilantism vs. rule of law[158][159]. Some social media users disturbingly praised the idea of rough justice for a “cop killer,” not realizing they were amplifying the Casperlar gang’s narrative. This prompted human rights groups to remind authorities to uphold standards even for heinous criminals[158]. Overall, there was strong sympathy for the fallen officer; her funeral was well-attended and symbolic of the sacrifices honest officers make in an increasingly lawless environment.

The general public sentiment tends to support firm action against the gangs, but there’s also underlying anxiety. Many people feel that if these young thugs can commit such brazen acts, something is deeply broken in society. Op-eds and commentators have pointed to unemployment, social inequality, and the erosion of education and family supervision as breeding grounds for this problem[150][152]. There’s a narrative that the state was too busy persecuting political dissenters or obsessing over ideological battles, and took its eye off street crime – thus a “lawlessness” creeping in that even mafia bosses exploit[160][161]. Turkish sociologists and journalists have compared today’s scenario to the 1990s, when car bombings and gang assassinations were common, suggesting a cycle repeating and lamenting that lessons weren’t learned.

On the other hand, a segment of youth is unfortunately enthralled by gang culture. The massive view counts on gangster-rap videos and thousands of followers on gang-related TikTok accounts indicate a glamorization among some teens. Slang from gangland has entered youth lingo. There are online fan pages for certain gang leaders (especially those who posture like anti-heroes). Some compare them to folk figures – for example, Sedat Peker (an older mob boss) garnered a bizarre fan following in 2021 with YouTube videos exposing corruption. Now, someone like Can Dalton, with nicknames like “İstanbul’un Sefiri” (Ambassador of Istanbul) or “Sokakların Hakimi” (Ruler of the Streets) in songs[162], can be mythologized in similar ways by disaffected youth. This has raised concern that a new generation of folk outlaws is being idolized, complicating efforts to demonize them.

Mainstream media in Turkey, especially pro-government outlets, initially underplayed the phenomenon (perhaps not to admit a security lapse). But by 2024, even state-friendly media like CNN Türk and TRT were running segments on “Yeni Nesil Mafya” and how to stop it[134][163]. Investigative journalists have dug into these gangs’ backgrounds, publishing exposés. For instance, the leftist news site soL Haber ran a two-part series titled “Çeteciliğin Anatomisi” (Anatomy of Gangsterism) profiling who these gangsters are and how they organize[134]. Such reporting has helped inform the public discourse and push police to be transparent about their operations.

There is also a public demand for reforms: be it legal reforms (harsher punishment for gang crimes, even debate about lowering the age of criminal responsibility for severe crimes), or social reforms (improved youth outreach, sports and arts programs in slums to divert kids from gangs). Nonprofits and community groups have started small-scale interventions in some areas, but the scale of the problem is daunting.

Paradoxically, some older mafia figures have tried to distance themselves from the new ones. They publicly denounce the new gangs as “random punks” without honor or code, perhaps in an attempt to assert their own relevance or to caution the state not to lump all underworld actors together. For example, Sedat Peker (before being silenced) derided the idea that these young gangs could ever have existed in the old days without being controlled, indirectly criticizing the government’s oversight[164][128]. This kind of commentary sometimes finds a sympathetic ear among citizens nostalgic for the “old order” where, as the saying goes, even the criminals had some principles.

Finally, a segment of the public views the gang wars with morbid curiosity, treating it almost like a Netflix crime drama playing out in real life. They share CCTV footage of shootouts or memes of gangsters, in a sensationalist feedback loop that unfortunately feeds the gangs’ ego. But as incidents like stray bullets killing innocents or violent armed clashes in city centers become more frequent, fear is overtaking curiosity. There’s a palpable concern for public safety – people worry about being in the wrong place at the wrong time, whether at a cafe, on a highway, or at a hospital, should two gangs decide to have a shootout.

In summary, the public perception is one of serious concern and a clamor for the state to restore order. While a fringe glamorizes these gangsters, the majority see them as a symptom of deeper social ills and want robust action. The new generation gangs have, in a sense, tested Turkish society’s resilience – prompting a collective reckoning on how to steer its youth away from the abyss and how to reinforce the rule of law in a time of flux.

Comparison of Key New-Generation Gangs (2020–2025)

To summarize the characteristics and activities of the major gangs discussed, the table below compares their leadership, origins, scope, and criminal profiles:

Sources: Information compiled from Turkish indictments and media reports[9][168][64][50][15] (as detailed in the analysis above).

[1] [3] [4] [6] [8] [35] [36] [49] [69] [70] [71] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [86] [87] [89] [91] [98] [99] [104] [105] [106] [108] [109] [110] [111] [117] [118] [119] [120] [135] [143] [144] [149] [150] [151] [152] [153] [154] [155] [156] [163] ‘Yeni nesil mafya’: Türkiye’deki yeni tip suç örgütleri hakkında neler biliniyor? – BBC News Türkçe

https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cjr3n1j7w3xo

[2] [7] [9] [14] [16] [21] [27] [31] [32] [33] [45] [46] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [90] [112] [133] [134] [167] Yeni nesil mafya – Vikipedi

https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yeni_nesil_mafya

[5] [128] [132] [141] [142] [164] Yeni nesil mafya – Saygı Öztürk – Sözcü

https://www.sozcu.com.tr/yeni-nesil-mafya-p86687

[10] [11] [12] [13] [19] [20] [126] [160] [161] [165] [OPINION] Erdoğan’s Turkey is too lawless to get even a mafia boss extradited – Turkish Minute

https://turkishminute.com/2025/05/09/opinion-erdogans-turkey-is-too-lawless-to-get-even-a-mafia-boss-extradited/

[15] [23] [24] [25] [26] [94] [101] [102] Investigation by Italian authorities offers insight into Turkish mafia clan wars – Turkish Minute

https://turkishminute.com/2024/08/13/investigation-italian-authorities-offered-insight-turkish-mafia-clan-war/

[17] [18] [22] [114] [121] [124] [125] [127] [131] [137] [140] Italy says disrupts Turkish armed group, arrests major boss – Turkish Minute

https://www.turkishminute.com/2024/05/22/italy-say-disrupt-turkish-armed-group-arrest-major-boss/

[28] [29] [30] [34] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [72] [83] [84] [85] [88] [107] [123] [136] [138] [139] [162] [166] [168] How Türkiye’s new generation mafia Daltonlar lures teens with TikTok, luxury life – Türkiye Today

https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/how-turkiyes-new-generation-mafia-daltonlar-lures-teens-with-tiktok-luxury-life-3205724

[47] [48] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [159] The Casper gang took responsibility for the murderer who martyred the female police officer in Ümraniye.

https://en.haberler.com/the-casper-gang-took-responsibility-for-the-1998047/

[55] [122] [145] [147] [148] Murder of Mattia Ahmet Minguzzi – Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Mattia_Ahmet_Minguzzi

[56] [57] [58] [59] [146] [157] Parents seek justice as trial opens in Turkish teen’s death | Daily Sabah

https://www.dailysabah.com/turkiye/parents-seek-justice-as-trial-opens-in-turkish-teens-death/news

[67] Montenegro extradites gang leader to Türkiye – Hürriyet Daily News

https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/montenegro-extradites-gang-leader-to-turkiye-200094

[68] Türkiye dismantles hundreds of organised crime groups in a year

https://www.trtworld.com/article/16839551

[92] [93] [95] [96] [97] [115] [116] [129] [130]  Perspective: Unmasking the Turf Wars − The Complex Rivalries of Turkish Mafia Groups in Europe and Links to Latin America | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/08/27/perspective-unmasking-turf-wars-complex-rivalries-turkish-mafia-groups-europe-and-links/

[100] Turkey: Massive Operation Takes on Organized Crime Nationwide

https://www.occrp.org/en/news/turkey-massive-operation-takes-on-organized-crime-nationwide

[103] [113] Italian police foil attempted attack on Catholic festival; Turkish suspects arrested- Detroit Catholic

https://www.detroitcatholic.com/news/italian-police-foil-attempted-attack-on-catholic-festival-turkish-suspects-arrested

[158] Treatment of suspect in police murder draws ire in Turkey

https://www.duvarenglish.com/treatment-of-suspect-in-police-murder-draws-ire-in-turkey-news-65002