Erkan's field diary

Kenan Evren admits that the banning of Kurdish language was a mistake (11)

"Abdullah Öcalan" should have been executed but because of the EU process we could not execute him. I am not against execution.  (15)

The political authorities hesitated to execute Öcalan because the US and the EU (17).

Suspicious relations between US, PKK and American Peace Forces in Souteastern Anatolia in 1991. (19-20)

Repeatedly civil political authorities are criticised:

Özal government was indifferent to the PKK threat. Army officials should not be held responsible (23).

However, Mr. Bila underlines the responsibility of both army and civil authority at the rise of PKK. (26-7)

Mr. Bila quotes M. Ali Kışlalı, probably the most pro-army columnist in Turkish press. Mr. Kışlalı claims that there was a lack of army strategy in the early years of PKK (27-9). 

Summary of Army strategy (32). An army based on the Cold war strategies of conventional warfare.

Doğan Güreş [who is a very respected chief of staff who initiated the counter-insurgency tactics against PKK]

In the context of the region, he states that US always wants more but "when you show your will, US will retreat (37)

Even the shift from martial law to State of Emergency (OHAL) in Southeast was not welcome. With the introduction of civil authorities, "the commanding hierarchy became loose" (42). ["OHAL" in Southeast started with The 1983 State of Emergency Law and ended in 2002. For more information on OHAL like legal regulations against terrorism see Administrative reforms against terrorism (Republic of Turkey) in Wikipedia.]

Mr. Bila later quotes the memories of General Sarızeybek (2006) who claims that every squad raised money to buy more advanced weapons to use against PKK guerillas (64). Despite the significant rate allocated for the army in the annual state budget, high level generals implied the indifference of politicians again.

Gen. Güreş also states that reform legislations in relation to EU process encouraged PKK (79).

Again, this time Gen. Necati Özgen states that soldiers did what they were supposed to do but politicians did not.. (99). He also points out that the EU Progress reports continuously mentioned minorities. In one of them, he saw that the word, minority was used 63 times. the EU's approach seems to encourage terrorists (100).

Ismail Hakkı Karadayı and Hasan Kundakçı also accuse politicians (94-8 and 123 respectively) The former complains about the external [mostly Western] support for PKK and talks about American weapons at PKK members [This was a big issue this year but Gen. Karadayı points out that American weapons were an issue even in mid-1990s.]

Generals repeatedly insist on the claim that PKK had move advanced weaponry than the Turkish army had. (133,138)

Only in around 1994, politicians, (Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller) started to support the army directly. (142)

Lieutenant general Hasan Kundakçı also laments for the situation that Öcalan was not executed because of the EU reforms (152) and explicitly claims that "USA helped PKK as part of BOP [the Greater Middle Easti a political term invented by the current Bush government in US and widely quoted in Turkey to argue for imperialist American plans in the Middle East, see Wikipedia entry on the Greater Middle East] (153). [Generals mostly imply this strongly but here Gen. Kundakçı did not bother for implying.]

Most of the generals believe that the parliamentary decision in 1 March 2003 not to approve a bill allowing in American combat troops to open a northern front against Iraq was a big mistake (see more in "Turkish American relations", Wikipedia). "Turkey lost the initiative against PKK when she did not execute Öcalan and when American soldiers began to flow in the region. [if Turkey acted with US, Turkey could control the Kurdish areas easily] (154). "If 1 March bill was approved by the parliament, PKK would cease to exist" (155).

General Aytaç Yalman lists 10 turning points in the struggle against PKK 203-4)
1- PKK's first gendarme post ambushes in 1984.
2- the fall of Berlin Wall, 1989.
3- the collapse of USSR, 1991
4- the First Gulf War, 1991
5- Turkish army begins to take the initiative in its struggle with PKK, 1994.
6- Ankara process, 1996. Dominance by the army.
7- Washington accord, 1998. Some Kurdish leaders are invited to Washington by the US government and American influence in the region begins.
8- Öcalan is captured, 1999
9- 1 March bill, 2003
10- US invades Iraq, 2003.

[As can be seen most of turning more immediate turning points are related to the US influence]

Hilmi Özkök mentions the "hood event" (see more "Hood Event" in Wikipedia). "An event that stunned the Turkish pride (242-243) but he also seems to downplay the event as "American soldiers sometimes do very stupid things". Among all the interviewed generals, Hilmi Özkök has a uniquely democratic standing. During his term as the Chief of Staff, he was constantly criticised by the Kemalist circles for being too tolerant for the Islamist government. He is the only one who has a positive approach to EU membership. "Support for PKK will cease as we become members" he believes (for more of Gen. Özkök's approach to EU see Fikret Bila's 1 October 2007 column in Milliyet)

General İlker Başbuğ has been a vocal army leader. He both warns US and laments for the Turkish-American relations (298-9)

Mr. Bila gives some clues about the the last interviewee, general Yaşar Büyükanıt who is the current chief of staff (302). Gen. Büyükanıt has a high presence in media and Mr. Bila states that Gen. Büyükanıt used to be in charge in army press offices during his long career. He also has an academic side as he has written several books to be used in Turkish military schools. Büyükanıt continues the line of arguments that seemed to be disrupted in Gen. Özkök's term.

As Mr. Bila concludes, all these staunch guardians of Turkish nation state now accept the existence of "Kurdish reality" (321). However, only Gen. Özkök remains positive for the EU membership while the others hold varying positions ranging from sceptical to hostile...